









Incorporating changes in life expectancy into economic growth rates: 









Longevity-adjusted growth rates are computed for Belgium over the period 1867-1997, by using a method based 
on contributions by Usher (1973a, 1980), Williamson (1984) and Miller (2000). Adjusted growth rates 
substantially differ from conventional figures, which may have tended to underestimate actual well-being 
improvements, especially during the second half of the 20th century. The analysis of the size of the adjustments, 
size which varies across periods, reveals that the post-1974 growth slowdown might have been less severe, in 
terms of social well-being, than suggested by usual measures. Our results, being robust to the introduction of 
some degree of endogeneity of longevity, seem to avoid the double-counting criticism. Several shortcomings of 
our method are discussed and some directions are proposed for future research. It is concluded that, thanks to 
their richer informational basis, longevity-adjusted growth rates constitute promising indicators to complement 
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1: Introduction: incorporating longevity into growth rates: why and how? 
 
Developed during the interwar period by distinguished economists such as Kuznets in 
the United States, Stone and Meade in the United Kingdom and Lindhal in Sweden, national 
accounts statistics revolutionized economics by improving the design and the assessment of 
economic policies and also by allowing the empirical testing of models. National income is 
often regarded not only as a measure of economic activity, but also as a synthetic indicator of 
social well-being in an economy, whose growth is usually interpreted as reflecting – at least to 
some extent – economic or social progress. However, it is widely acknowledged that national 
income constitutes an imperfect measure of the final output contributing to well-being and an 
incomplete indicator of social well-being itself. For instance, national income includes 
expenditures affecting social well-being in a negative way (‘regrettable necessities’) and also 
ignores or mistreats numerous components of well-being, such as, among other things, the 
enjoyment of a good health, of an unpolluted natural environment, of natural resources, of 
leisure time, of freedoms and political rights.
1 Moreover, national income does not tell us 
anything about the level of inequality, which is problematic, if one considers that social well-
being also depends on distributive considerations.
2 Furthermore, while well-being also 
consists of, besides the (relatively) objective components mentioned above, subjective 
elements such as happiness, the evolution of social welfare or happiness over time does not 
seem to be well captured by usual GDP figures, as illustrated by Easterlin’s (1974) Paradox.
3 
The present paper is concerned with one particular shortcoming of national income as a 
social well-being indicator: its neglect of changes in the length of human life. This neglect 
constitutes an important weakness, because a long life is a central component of human well-
being. The achievement of numerous personal goals – whatever these might be – is often 
conditional on, among other things, a long life, so that information on the length of life should 
not be neglected by a social well-being indicator. The neglect of longevity may be misleading 
for cross-country comparisons of well-being, because large differences in longevity may exist 
between countries regarded as similar in the light of other indicators (see Dreze and Sen, 
1989). Ignoring longevity improvements (which vary substantially across periods) may also 
lead to biased pictures of social well-being evolution over time (see Kakwani, 1993). 
However, the need to incorporate information on longevity within national accounts 
statistics has often been questioned. A usual criticism consists of claiming that longevity is, by 
definition, a demographic – but non-economic – phenomenon, which national accounts 
statistics should not include. In my view, that argument does not hold, because of two reasons. 
Firstly, that argument makes the extent to which longevity is an economic phenomenon 
depend ultimately on how the term ‘economic’ is defined. However, there is no unique 
definition of that term, and, in the light of some definitions, longevity may be regarded as 
something that belongs to the realm of economics. For instance, Pigou (1928, pp. 10-11) 
defined economics as the science whose subject-matter is ‘economic welfare’, ‘economic 
welfare’ being defined as ‘the part of social welfare that can be brought directly or indirectly 
into relation with the measuring-rod of money’. While that definition – as Pigou himself 
acknowledged – provides no rigid separation between economic and non-economic welfare 
(see Bliss, 1993), it seems to me that, in the light of the voluminous literature on the value of 
a statistical life, longevity can be brought – although with some difficulties – into relation 
with money. Hence, according to Pigou’s definitions, longevity belongs to economic welfare, 
so that national accounts statistics, even defined as measuring economic welfare only, should 
not neglect longevity. Numerous other definitions of economics would also justify the study 
of longevity by economists. So does the widespread definition of economics as the science 
studying the ability of economies to overcome the fundamental problems of scarcity (North, 
1994). It is undoubtedly true that the lifetime of any human being is limited – because of   2 
 
 
various economic and non-economic reasons – and, hence, the length of life, being scarce, 
constitutes a natural topic for economic analysis. 
Secondly, as Sen (1994) rightly argued, whatever the narrowness of the definition of 
‘economic’ to which economists adhere, there is no obvious reason why economists should 
confine themselves to what a particular definition of ‘economic’ suggests, and neglect, in their 
assessment of a country’s performance, the growth of other variables than GDP (e.g. 
longevity) that are also influenced by economic policy. Longevity is affected by economic 
policy and thus it should be included in the informational basis used for the assessment of 
economic policy. For that assessment purpose, the extra information provided by longevity 
statistics should have the priority on semantic conflicts on what ‘economic’ means. 
But beyond the issue of whether longevity is an economic phenomenon, the use of 
longevity statistics as a social well-being indicator, or, more generally, as a part of a wider 
social well-being indicator, has often been criticized, and it is worth considering here several 
arguments, discussed by Sen (1973a, 1998), against such a use of longevity statistics. Firstly, 
it is often argued that using longevity as a social well-being indicator is useless, because there 
exists a positive relationship between the level of income per head and the length of life, so 
that mortality rates would tell the same story as the one told by GDP per capita. I shall 
address the double-counting criticism later in this paper, but it should be stressed that the 
relationship between national income and life expectancy is not as simple as it might appear at 
first sight, so that constructing an indicator including information on longevity is – at least in 
principle – justified. Secondly, it might also be argued against the use of longevity statistics 
that, given that changes in mortality affect the population size, one could capture those 
changes by using the total GDP instead of the GDP per capita. However, as Sen (1973a) 
underlined, a population might remain constant even if life expectancy at birth changes, 
provided birth rates evolve in such a way that the population remains unaffected, so that total 
GDP could not capture the actual social well-being change. Thirdly, it is also argued that life 
expectancy statistics are too sluggish statistics to assess a country’s performance. That 
criticism does not stand up to empirical evidence showing large fluctuations of life 
expectancy statistics in situations of social instability (civil wars, famines, diseases, etc.). 
Moreover, as Sen (1998) rightly argued, the extent to which one considers an indicator to be 
sluggish depends on the normalisation that is used.
4 Fourthly, it might also be argued against 
the use of life expectancy in particular (and not against mortality rates) that there might be 
some kind of incompatibility between national accounts statistics and life expectancy 
statistics: while the former deals with present well-being, the latter is concerned with future 
well-being. However, national accounts statistics, which evaluate the part of current 
production that is saved and invested in order to increase future wealth, are not concerned 
with present well-being only. Sen (1973a) underlined – not without irony – that, while a rise 
in the ‘expectation of life’ of a piece of machinery leads to a higher national income, a rise in 
human life expectancy does not have the same effect. Therefore the incompatibility argument 
does not hold. Fifthly, the incorporation of longevity statistics is often accused of being 
‘arbitrary’. Nevertheless, any act of description – and thus of measurement – necessarily 
involves some choices (see Sen, 1980b). Excluding longevity statistics is not less arbitrary 
than including these. 
It follows from those discussions that there seems to be, on close examination, no strong 
argument against the incorporation of longevity information within social well-being 
indicators. However, even if the necessity to use longevity statistics as a (part of a) social 
well-being indicator is acknowledged, there might still remain disagreements on how the 
incorporation of longevity statistics ought to be made. There exist two possible ways to 
proceed.
5 On the one hand, one might adjust the conventional statistics by incorporating 
within these the element that was neglected. On the other hand, one might introduce longevity   3 
 
 
into an index including various indicators of well-being (e.g. United Nations’ Human 
Development Index, HDI, UNDP, 1990). Throughout this paper, I shall confine myself to the 
first approach. 
Since the early 1960s, various methods have been developed in order to adjust national 
accounts statistics for changes in life expectancy. In a pioneer article, Weisbrod (1962) 
proposed to complement conventional income by a wider indicator, the capitalized value of 
expected future income per capita, which takes into account not only current income 
conditions, but also expected future income (earnings and non-earnings), current and expected 
employment opportunities and current and expected survival probabilities at each age 
(expectations being equal to current conditions). In a related way, Sen (1973a) suggested to 
take changes in longevity into account by estimating the lifetime expected income of a typical 
person, that is, by aggregating incomes over the expected human life span rather than over 
one year, as it is usually done. Expected lifetime income could be approximated here by 
multiplying current income per head by current life expectancy at birth, which could be 
divided by some assumed standard level of longevity in order to make interpretations more 
convenient. Other techniques have also been developed, for instance by Usher (1973a, 1980) 
and Nordhaus (1998). Those methods, which consist of adding the income or consumption-
equivalent of the utility of a longer life (i.e. ‘health income’) to conventional income, and then 
computing the growth in the resulting ‘adjusted’ income, differ fundamentally from Weisbrod 
and Sen’s approaches regarding their treatment of people’s preferences with respect to the 
length of their life. Unlike Weisbrod and Sen’s approaches, which do not take people’s own 
valuations into account, Usher and Nordhaus’ frameworks assign to longevity changes 
weights derived from empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL), which 
corresponds to the amount of money a group of people would be willing to pay to reduce risks 
of death in the expectation of saving one life (see Schelling, 1968). One might criticize the 
(more) ‘democratic’ nature of Usher and Nordhaus’s VSL-based weights, on the grounds that 
one should not base social evaluations on the ‘anarchy of individual preferences’ (see Fromm, 
1968). However, despite the weaknesses of VSL-based weights, it might be worth 
constructing a social well-being indicator using these as a complement to indicators using 
more arbitrary weights (e.g. HDI). 
Throughout this paper, the method I shall follow, to which I shall refer as the ‘Usher-
Williamson-Miller’ approach, is a version of Usher’s (1973a, 1980) framework that was 
slightly modified by Williamson (1984) in order to take the double-counting criticism into 
account, and where the values of key parameters are selected by means of Miller’s (2000) 
empirical rules of thumb, which express the VSL as a multiple of real GDP per capita.  
It should be stressed here that longevity-adjusted growth rates neglect many dimensions 
of well-being, and thus are – as any well-being indicator – incomplete and imperfect. This 
point requires some comments. According to Sen (1973a), no perfect social well-being 
indicator could be ever constructed, because (1) social well-being contains subjective 
components on which disagreements might subsist forever; (2) well-being is a complex multi-
faceted concept that could be hardly captured by a single – though composite – indicator; (3) 
there is a strong constraint on the availability of the data necessary for measuring the chosen 
concept. Moreover, besides Sen’s remarks, the inquiry into a perfect indicator of social well-
being  changes over time is made even more difficult by the existence of changing 
preferences. If one wants an indicator to reflect people’s preferences and to be meaningful 
(i.e. to assess the evolution of well-being in the light of some preferences taken as a 
reference), an impossibility might occur if preferences change over time. However, the 
difficulties to derive a perfect social well-being indicator – in a static and, a fortiori, in a 
dynamic context – constitute arguments for a plurality of indicators. Hence longevity-adjusted   4 
 
 
growth rates should be regarded as complements rather than substitutes to already existing 
social well-being indicators. 
This paper is organized as follows. Theoretical foundations of the Usher-Williamson-
Miller method are presented in Section 2. Growth rates adjusted for changes in longevity are 
then computed for Belgium over the period 1867-1997 (Section 3). Section 4 is concerned 
with methodological issues, and aims at assessing not only our estimates, but also adjusted 
figures in general, which become increasingly popular in the economic history literature.
6 
Some directions are also suggested for future research. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
 
2: Theoretical foundations of the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework 
 
The first part of this Section deals with the main assumptions of Usher’s (1973a, 1980) 
model. Then, I shall present the modifications introduced by Williamson (1984) and, finally, 
Miller’s (2000) empirical work, which plays an important role in the calibration exercise. 
 
Usher’s (1973a, 1980) model 
 
Usher’s (1973a, 1980) pioneer model consists of a framework in which a representative 
consumer faces a complete uncertainty regarding the length of his (remaining) future life.
7 It 
is assumed that the representative individual’s utility is a function of the utility associated to 
each possible scenario (corresponding to a different length of remaining life), and of the 
probabilities of occurrence of each scenario: 
 
(1) U(t) = U(U0, P0, U1, P1,…, Un, Pn)  
 
where U(t) is the representative agent’s welfare at time t, Uj is the utility of a remaining future 
life of exactly j years (from now), and Pj is the probability of occurrence of a remaining life of 
exactly j years. Usher assumes n to be the maximum length of the representative consumer’s 
(remaining) future life. One should notice that Uj, Pj and n depend on the representative 
consumer’s age. 
Usher’s adjustment method is based on the assumption that consumers cannot affect 
their probabilities of survival, and thus cannot influence the probabilities of having lives of 
various lengths.
8 That perfect exogeneity assumption is strong, because people do actually 
affect their life expectancy by their consumption choices (e.g. by their decisions to drive a 
car). However, the opposite assumption (treating life as a good that could be purchased) 
would be even stronger. 
Implicit in expression (1) is the exclusion of the experienced past welfare: the 
representative agent is assumed to be a forward-looking, but not backward-looking agent. 
While the exclusion of the past is a strong postulate, it can nevertheless be defended on 
paternalistic grounds: one may actually consider that the measurement of the welfare change 
between two periods should not depend on the welfare experienced in a past, distant period 
(e.g. the measurement of welfare change between 2002 and 2003 should be independent of 
the welfare during World War Two).
9  
While the assumption of a forward-looking representative agent is compatible with 
various functional forms for his utility function, and with various ways to form expectations 
regarding future consumption and future survival probabilities, the next two assumptions are 
more restrictive.  
First, the representative agent is assumed to form his expectations regarding future 
consumption flows and future survival probabilities on the basis of the current consumptions   5 
 
 
flows and the current survival probabilities. In other words, it is supposed that the 
representative agent believes that the current age-specific consumption and age-specific 
survival probabilities will hold in the future. Those assumptions are strong, because there 
exist numerous other ways to form expectations regarding the future (e.g. one may expect 
some progress in longevity or some economic growth). However, those assumptions can be 
justified on the grounds that a measure of social welfare change over time should depend on 
current, actual achievements – rather than on predicted achievements – so that it makes sense 
to rely on current consumption and current survival probabilities. 
Second, it is assumed that the representative agent, facing a situation of uncertainty 
regarding the length of his remaining life, behaves as an expected utility maximizer. In other 
words, the representative agent’s welfare is supposed to be equal to the sum of the utilities 
associated to each possible length of (remaining) life, weighted by the probability of 
occurrence of each length:
10 
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where Uj, the consumer’s welfare if he lives exactly j (remaining) years, depends on all the 
consumption flows Ci during the (remaining) j years of life, which are all estimated by their 
current levels (i.e. at time t).
11 Expression (2) corresponds to the consumer’s expected utility, 
where the possible lengths of (remaining) life are supposed to be mutually exclusive states of 
the world, and the probabilities Pj’s, which are also estimated at time t, correspond to their 
occurrences. One should note here that expression (2) incorporates the – somewhat restrictive 
– above assumption according to which expected future consumption flows and survival 
probabilities are assumed to be equal to their current values at t. 
It might be worth discussing briefly the adequacy of the expected utility hypothesis in 
the present context. As stated in the Expected Utility Theorem, if a decision maker’s 
preference ordering (i.e. complete and transitive) over lotteries satisfies the continuity axiom 
and the independence axiom, then his preferences can be represented by a function with the 
expected utility form.
12 While the ordinality axiom and the continuity axiom are most often 
accepted, the same cannot be said of the independence axiom. Since the Allais Paradox 
(1953), it is well-known that the independence postulate can be violated in actual behaviour, 
which casts some doubts on the adequacy of the independence axiom. 
However, the fact that the independence axiom may not be satisfied in actual behaviour 
does not necessarily question the use of the expected utility hypothesis in the present context. 
Actually, it can be argued that adjusted growth rates should not measure changes in standards 
of living as these are valued by people in facts, but, rather, these should measure changes in 
standards of living as these should be valued by ‘rational’ people whose preferences satisfy 
the independence axiom, or can be represented by a utility function having the expected utility 
form. In other words, the expected utility hypothesis can be here defended on ‘paternalistic’ 
grounds. It is clear that such a defence could be attacked in the light of Hume’s claim that 
rationality is only about means for a given end, but does not concern ends, so that preferences 
over lotteries violating the independence axiom cannot be regarded as ‘irrational’. Whereas 
Humean thinkers will prefer relying on other theories of choice under uncertainty, which are 
more satisfactory from a descriptive point of view, such as the disappointment theory (see 
Mas-Colell  et al, 1995), it does not seem to me that the measurement of social welfare 
changes over time can remain meaningful if made in the light of valuations governed by 
feelings such as disappointment. Hence, throughout this study, we shall rely on the expected 
utility hypothesis. But it should be stressed here that such an adherence is rooted on 
‘paternalistic’ considerations, i.e. on an idea of how people should make their valuations.   6 
 
 
Usher also assumes that the utility function for a given length of life is additively-
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where r is the subjective discount rate and β is the elasticity of annual utility with respect to 
annual consumption. Like Usher, we shall assume that the marginal utility of consumption is 
positive (i.e. β is strictly positive), but decreasing (i.e. 0 < β < 1). 
As it was stressed by Cowen (1989) and Broome (1991a), the assumption of additive-
separability over time is a very strong one, because it neglects the possibility of welfare 
interconnections between different periods of someone’s life. Usher justifies that restrictive 
assumption on the grounds of its convenience. But, alternatively, one may justify that 
assumption on paternalistic grounds, that is, on the grounds that welfare interconnections 
between different periods of life may constitute a kind of ‘irrational’ valuations that should 
not affect the measurement of social welfare changes over time. More precisely, welfare 
interconnections between different periods of life might lead to the ‘sacrifice’ of some periods 
for the sake of others, or for the sake of ‘higher’, lifetime objectives. Such ‘sacrifices’ might 
be regarded as resulting from some kind of irrationality, which should not affect the 
measurement of social welfare changes over time.
13 
Expression (3)’s ‘paternalistic’ neglect of all kinds of welfare interconnections between 
periods of life also rules out the particular case of habit formation, that is, the existence of 
preferences such that what matters is not the absolute achievement in the components of 
individual welfare, but the relative size of the achievement compared with a past reference 
(e.g. the best past experience). While the neglect of habit formation might be regarded as 
problematic in the light of empirical evidence supporting the existence of that phenomenon 
(see Helson, 1964; Brickman et al, 1978), two remarks should be made here. Firstly, there 
exist also substantial empirical evidence showing the limits  of the habit formation 
mechanisms (see Veenhoven, 1991; Diener et al, 1993). Those studies underlined that 
absolute achievements also matter, whatever the achievements reached by your neighbour or 
the ones reached in the past.
14 Secondly, the ‘paternalistic’ argument mentioned above can 
still be used here: even if it was shown that people assess their welfare in the light of a 
particular standard, it would not be obvious that a measure of social welfare change should 
necessarily adopt the same standard as the absolute reference. 
It should be stressed that expression (3) defines individual welfare in a very narrow way. 
For instance, it does not assign any intrinsic value to the length of life.
15 Moreover, it makes 
the utility of life depend on consumption only, so that non-market activities are supposed to 
have no effect on welfare. Furthermore, it follows from expressions (2) and (3) that Usher 
also assumes that the representative consumer’s welfare does not depend, in any way, on the 
existence of other people (family, friends, etc).  
Those highly debatable assumptions will be discussed in Section 4. Substituting 
expression (3) into expression (2) gives us the following expression:
16 
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the beginning of the period), estimated at time t.
17 Equation (4) implies that, provided β is 
positive, the representative consumer is happier if his consumption in any year is increased, or 
if his probability of dying in any year is reduced. 
Usher also supposes that consumption is constant across ages and equal to current real 
income: 
 
(5)  C0(t) = C1(t) = … = Cn(t) = Y(t)                                                                                     
 
Expression (5), which implies that the measurement of lifetime welfare can be made in terms 
of current real income, is based on Usher’s assumption that real income is the maximum 
consumption that can be sustained indefinitely with present technology and resources. When 
combined with the assumption that the representative individual forms his expectations 
regarding the future on the basis of what currently holds, expression (5) implies that the 
representative agent assumes, at time t, that he will consume, at any future period of life, the 
same consumption as the one that is currently enjoyed.
18  
Substituting expression (5) within (4) allows us to rewrite the latter as: 
 
(6)  U(t) = Y(t)
β L(t)                                                                                                              
 
















t S is the discounted life expectancy. 
Usher defines the real income inclusive of an imputation for change in life expectancy, 
denoted by Ŷ(t), as the amount such that if a representative consumer had that income in year t 
and every year after while being subject to the mortality rates of a base year t*, he would be 
as well off as he is currently with the consumption and mortality rates prevailing at t:  
 
(7)  U(Ŷ(t), D(t*)) = U(Y(t), D(t))                                                                                        
 
where D(t) is a vector of mortality rates in year t, Y(t) is the real income in year t without the 
imputation for changes in longevity and t* is the base year. In order to illustrate that the 
longevity-adjusted income Ŷ(t) incorporates an imputation for the variation in life expectancy 
between periods t* and t, let us consider Figure 1, which represents the indifference curves of 
three representative agents, living respectively in 1900, 1950 and 2000.
19 For convenience, let 
us suppose that each agent can only live 2 periods (i.e. n = 2). It is assumed that they all face 
probabilities D(t) of dying at the beginning of the second period. Their utility functions are 
assumed to be the same, and their consumption is assumed to be the same in each period (so 
that real income Y(t) and real consumption are equal). Figure 1 clearly illustrates that, for 
constant preferences across time, the representative individual has a higher welfare in 2000, 
because he enjoys at that time a much larger (unadjusted) income and a lower mortality rate 
(i.e. a higher survival probability) than his predecessors.  
If the survival conditions of 1900 are taken as a reference (i.e. t* = 1900), then the 
adjusted income Ŷ(1950) corresponds to the income such that, if the representative agent 
living in 1950 had that adjusted income while enjoying the mortality conditions of year 1900, 
then he would be as well off (i.e. on the same indifference curve) as with the (unadjusted) 
income and the survival conditions of year 1950. In other words, Ŷ(1950) is such that, given 
the assumptions made on individual welfare, it would exactly ‘compensate’ the representative 
individual of 1950 for facing the worse mortality conditions of 1900. In that sense, Ŷ(1950) is 
inclusive of an imputation for changes in mortality conditions. Similarly, Ŷ(2000) is such that 
the representative agent of year 2000 would be indifferent between having Ŷ(2000) and the 
survival probability of year 1900 and having Y(2000) and benefiting from the mortality   8 
 
 
conditions of year 2000. Figure 1 also illustrates that the adjusted growth rate differs 
significantly from the conventional growth rate. 
 
Figure 1: Real income inclusive of an imputation for the change in the mortality rate 
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Substituting (6) in (7) and isolating Ŷ(t) gives: 
 
(8)  Ŷ(t) = Y(t) [L(t)/L(t*)]
1/β                                                                                              
 
It is important to stress here that, ceteris paribus, the smaller the β is, the larger Ŷ(t) is. The 
rationale behind this statement goes as follows. The larger the β, the more ‘materialistic’ the 
representative agent is, so that a small increase in his income is sufficient to compensate the 
worse survival conditions faced in t*. Hence, under a large β, the adjusted income Ŷ(t) is very 
close to the unadjusted income Y(t). Alternatively, if β is low, the contribution of consumption 
to welfare is little, so that a large monetary compensation is required to make the 
representative agent indifferent between the two states, so that Ŷ(t) is much larger than Y(t). 
In the light of expression (8), one can then derive the longevity-adjusted growth rate, 
denoted by GŶ, equal to the sum of the real income growth rate GY  and the growth in 
discounted life expectancy GL, the latter being weighted by the inverse of the elasticity of 
annual utility with respect to consumption:
20 
 
(9)  GŶ = GY + GL/β                                                                                                            
 
It follows from expression (9) that, if β is strictly positive, the effect of the imputation for 
lower mortality rates is necessarily to increase the growth rate. Provided β is also lower than 
1, the size of the correction exceeds the growth in discounted life expectancy. Moreover, a 
higher (lower) β corresponds to a lower (higher) weight assigned to improvements in the 
expected length of life, and thus leads, ceteris paribus,  to a smaller (larger) adjustment. 
Furthermore, one should note that the growth rate of the longevity-adjusted national income   9 
 
 
proposed by Sen (1973a) corresponds to a particular case of Usher’s GŶ for which β  is 
assumed to be equal to unity, independently of people’s preferences. 
Regarding the computation of GL, two important points should be stressed. Firstly, it 
follows from the present assumptions that people of different ages, who have different L, do 
not necessarily have the same Ŷ. If we compare the adjusted incomes of a young man of age i 
with the one of an old man of age j, expression (8) tells us that, ceteris paribus, this is only in 
the case in which Li(t)/Li(t*) is equal to Lj(t)/Lj(t*) that the two adjusted incomes will be the 
same.
21 Hence, in order to derive a ‘social’ adjusted growth rate, Usher suggests to compute 
the value of L of each year by weighting the discounted life expectancy of the different age 
groups with weights reflecting the proportions of those age groups in the population. 
Secondly, the fact that older people have generally a shorter (residual) life expectancy L 
suggests that, within the present approach, an economy could become better off by the mere 
increase in the proportion of young people in its population. In order to avoid the influence of 
changes in the age distribution of the population, we shall follow Usher’s intuition and 
compute population-weighted discounted life expectancies of each year by means of weights 
reflecting the age distribution of the population at a base year. Hence it follows from those 
two remarks that the computed GL will correspond to the growth in the population-weighted 
discounted life expectancy with population-weights from a base year. 
 
Williamson’s (1984) extension 
 
Turning now to Williamson’s (1984) refinement of Usher’s framework, it should be 
stressed that one of Usher’s main assumptions concerns the exogeneity of longevity: changes 
in mortality rates are assumed to be purely exogenous and thus independent of variations in 
income. That assumption was criticized by Williamson, who proposed to introduce, within 
Usher’s initial framework, the possibility of endogeneity of mortality conditions. According 
to Williamson, it is likely that life expectancy is significantly influenced by income growth. 
But, besides that empirically supported claim, Williamson also makes the stronger claim that 
longevity-adjusted growth rates should not reflect the total change in life expectancy, but only 
the change in life expectancy that is not caused by income growth (otherwise, according to 
Williamson, some ‘double-counting’ mistake would occur). It is far from straightforward to 
determine how relevant the cause of changes in survival conditions is as far as the adjustment 
of economic growth rates for changes in mortality conditions is concerned. But before 
discussing that question, let us firstly present Williamson’s refinement of Usher’s framework. 
In the light of Preston’s (1975) empirical work on the relationship between income 
growth and life expectancy, Williamson suggests to relax the perfect exogeneity assumption 
present in Usher’s model by assuming that the discounted life expectancy is related to 
consumption in the following way:
22 
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where the (unobservable) variable α(t) corresponds to L(t) in the case where life expectancy is 
not affected by consumption, while the constant γ is such that γ/α(t) corresponds to the 
‘subsistence’ consumption level C*(t) (for which L(t) = 0). Expression (10) suggests that the 
impact of consumption on longevity is positive but decreasing. In order to clarify the 
assumption made by Williamson, let us consider Figure 2, which shows the growth in 
consumption and life expectancy between periods 0 and 1. Figure 2 illustrates the distinction 
between, on the one hand, a change in life expectancy that is caused by consumption (or 
income) growth, and, on the other hand, a change in life expectancy that is caused by 
exogenous factors.
23 In the first case, there is a movement along the past life expectancy   10 
 
 
‘production function’, while, in the latter case, the ‘technological’ relationship between 
consumption and life expectancy is affected, in the sense that there is a shift upward of the life 
expectancy ‘production function’. 
The consumption level C*(0) corresponds to the initial subsistence level: if consumption 
is lower than that level, then there is no survival and thus life expectancy is zero. For 
consumption slightly higher than the subsistence level, the impact of a slight increase in 
consumption on life expectancy is substantial. Then, when consumption becomes larger, the 
effect of additional consumption on life expectancy diminishes, up to zero, as illustrated by 
the diminishing slope of the life expectancy ‘production function’. Actually, when life 
expectancy has reached the level α(0), increases in consumption can no longer affect it.  
 
Figure 2: Endogenous and exogenous changes in life expectancy 
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Let us now consider an exogenous change in life expectancy. As Williamson argued, 
exogenous changes in life expectancy could be captured either by a change in α or in γ. We 
shall focus here only on changes in α. Figure 2 illustrates an exogenous improvement in the 
‘production’ of life expectancy, which takes the form of a shift in the curve, with an increase 
in α, which becomes α(1). Such an increase in α can be regarded as the outcome of some 
exogenous factors. It corresponds to something like a ‘technological progress’ in the 
production of life expectancy by means of consumption, in the sense that, for any given level 
of consumption above C*(0), it is now possible to reach a higher level of life expectancy than 
before the shift. The shift of the curve has also the effect to reduce the consumption 
subsistence level from C*(0) to C*(1). The interpretation of that reduction goes as follows: 
the more ‘efficient’ technology allows us to be maintained alive at a lower consumption level 
than what was allowed under the past technology. Figure 2 allows us to decompose the 
growth in L between periods 0 and 1 in two effects: the change in L that is due to the increase 
of consumption for the given past production function corresponds to the endogenous change 
in L (i.e. the one caused by consumption growth only, that is, by consumption growth ceteris 
paribus), while the change in L that is represented by the upward shift of the curve   11 
 
 
corresponds to the exogenous change in L. This corresponds to the difference between the 
actual current life expectancy and the life expectancy that would have been achieved at the 
current consumption level under the past ‘production function’. 
Having discussed the assumed relationship between consumption and life expectancy, it 
is now possible to highlight the difference between Usher and Williamson’s frameworks. First 
of all, it is important to stress that, although consumption affects life expectancy within 
Williamson’s model – and not in Usher’s model –, the representative agent remains in a 
situation of uncertainty regarding the length of his (remaining) life, except in the case in 
which the consumption flow is lower than the subsistence level (i.e. the case in which P0 = 1). 
However, in most cases, future life remains a (non-trivial) ‘lottery’ with different lengths of 
(remaining) life, the only difference being that for any consumption level, there is a particular 
life expectancy determined by the consumption level, and thus particular mortality conditions. 
In other words, the representative agent within Williamson’s model keeps generally the most 
important feature of the representative agent in Usher’s model: he does not know, nor choose, 
the length of his future life, because only the expected length of his life (i.e. his life 
expectancy) is determined by consumption, but not his actual length of life. Hence 
Williamson’s additional assumption is not incompatible with the assumption of uncertainty 
regarding the length of remaining life, nor with the expected utility assumption made above.  
According to Williamson, the adjusted income should only reflect the exogenous change 
in life expectancy. Hence, expression (8) becomes: 
 
(11) Ŷ(t) = Y(t) [α(t)/α(t*)]
1/β                                                                                              
          
Unlike GL, Gα is not observable, but it can be rewritten, from (10), as:
24 
 
(12) Gα = GL – [Y*(0)/Y(0)] (GL+GY)     
                                                                              
where  Y*(0) corresponds to the income subsistence level. Hence, the longevity-adjusted 
growth rate, equal to GŶ = GY + (1/β)Gα, can be rewritten as: 
 
(13)  GŶ = GY + (1/β) GL – [(1/β) (Y*(t)/Y(t)) (GL+GY))]                                                                           
 
Expression (13) corresponds to the Usher-Williamson adjusted growth rates, where, for given 
values of β, GY and GL, the third term (the correction in order to avoid the double-counting) 
tends to decline over time, because [Y*(t)/Y(t)] usually tends to fall when t increases. This 
suggests that the size of Usher’s overestimation of GŶ is larger when the development process 
is at its earliest stages (that is, when Y*(t)/Y(t) is higher). Expression (13) can be rewritten as: 
 
(14)  GŶ = GY + (1/β) z GL                                                                                                 
 
where the exogeneity parameter z, equal to Gα / GL, is the (unobservable) share of (observed) 
changes in population-weighted discounted life expectancy that is not caused by income 
growth. Usher’s adjusted growth rate (9) corresponds to the special case of Williamson’s 
growth rate, where z is assumed to be equal to one (i.e. complete exogeneity of longevity). 
Let us now consider the implications from valuing, like Williamson, exogenous changes 
in life expectancy only. For that purpose, let us focus on two special cases. Firstly, the case in 
which there is a positive consumption growth between periods 0 and 1 [i.e. C(0) < C(1)], but 
no growth in life expectancy [i.e. L(0) = L(1)]. In such a case, Usher’s adjusted growth rate is 
simply equal to the consumption growth rate. However, according to Williamson, the 
consumption growth rate over-estimates the progress in living conditions between periods 0   12 
 
 
and 1. Actually, under expression (10), a constant L despite a positive consumption growth 
can only be achieved provided the life expectancy ‘production function’ has shifted 
downwards, that is, provided there has been some ‘technological regression’ between periods 
0 and 1 as far as the production of life expectancy is concerned. Williamson regards such a 
regression as a negative achievement, so that the ‘true’ adjusted consumption growth rate 
should be lower than the one based on Usher’s framework. In the alternative case in which 
there is a constant life expectancy but a negative consumption growth between periods 0 and 
1, Usher’s adjusted growth rate would still be equal to the consumption growth rate, while 
Williamson’s correction, based not on the observed life expectancy, but on the maximum L 
that can be potentially achieved for a given technological relation between consumption and 
life expectancy, would lead to a slightly larger (i.e. less negative) measure, because, according 
to Williamson, there must have been a kind of longevity ‘technological’ progress between 
periods 0 and 1 if life expectancy has remained constant despite the fall in consumption. 
Hence, the adjusted growth rate must take that progress into account. 
It follows from those examples that Williamson’s approach consists of valuing life 
expectancy changes not as such, but relative to what could have been achieved given the 
(assumed) past technology and the observed consumption growth. Is such a relative valuation 
of life expectancy changes justifiable, and, if yes, on which grounds? While one may argue 
that, if one is concerned with human well-being, the source of well-being should not affect the 
valuations (i.e. only the results count), it is nevertheless possible to argue that it may be the 
case that some consumption expenditures do not affect individual instantaneous utility, but 
only the length of life. Under that assumption, one can provide some justification to 
Williamson’s approach in the light of the two previous examples. In the first one, in which 
there is some growth in consumption but not in longevity, it is possible to justify 
Williamson’s correction on the grounds that it is true that Usher’s adjusted growth rate over-
estimates the ‘true’ growth in standards of living, because some part of the consumption 
growth is purely ‘nominal’, and does not affect welfare. In the second case, it can be argued 
that Usher’s measure over-estimates the regression, because it forgets that some part of the 
consumption is not welfare-producing, but only longevity-producing.  
Although intuitively attractive, that argument cannot justify Williamson’s correction on 
theoretical grounds, because it suffers from the fact that it presupposes a decomposition of 
consumption expenditures, instead of the homogeneous consumption good postulated 
throughout this study. However, the above argument suggests that Williamson’s correction 
has some intuitive appeal on pragmatic grounds. More precisely, Williamson’s approach can 
be regarded, in the light if the above argument, as a pragmatic – and somewhat approximate – 
solution to the double-counting problem. Actually, although it is clear that some consumption 
goods (e.g. medical operations) bring very little (instantaneous) utility directly, but only 
indirectly through an increase in longevity, it is nevertheless hard to select precisely the 
expenditures that have that property: many medical expenditures influence not only the length 
of life, but also the quality of life, so that there is, in their cases, a double output (and thus 
Usher’s imputation brings no double-counting). Hence a pragmatic solution to that problem 
consists of defining, at the aggregate level, a relationship between aggregate consumption and 
life expectancy, and then of making the adjustment only for the part of the observed change in 
life expectancy that is not caused by the aggregate consumption growth given the past life 
expectancy ‘production function’. One can thus regard Williamson’s correction as a ‘second-
best’ way of solving the complex double-counting problem. 
 
The calibration of preference parameters and Miller’s (2000) ‘rules of thumb’ 
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The most difficult part of the adjustment exercise consists of the choice of a value for 
the parameter β. For that purpose, we shall follow Usher (1973a, 1980), and derive plausible 
values for β from the empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL).
25 Although 
we shall, throughout this study, use values of β extrapolated from how people seem to value 
changes in the risk of death, it should be stressed here that there exist several other ways to 
extrapolate plausible values for β. 
Instead of using estimates of β from the VSL literature, one may, for instance, derive 
values for β from empirical estimates of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, equal 
here to 1/(1-β). As it is shown in Browning et al (1999), there is no consensus among 
empirical studies on the estimation of that elasticity. According to Browning et al, it is likely 
that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is slightly above 1 for non-durable goods, so 
that β should have a positive but low value. Alternatively, it is possible to extrapolate a value 
for β from empirical estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), which 
corresponds here to (1-β). However, as Kaplow (2003) noticed, the different empirical 
estimates of the CRRA are far from unanimous. In the light of that literature, it is unlikely that 
CRRA is lower than 1, so that β should be close to zero. 
It is crucial to emphasize, at this stage, that not only do the values of β differ 
substantially among studies of the same kind, but also, and more importantly, across studies 
of different kinds. As Kaplow (2003) underlined, there may exist an incompatibility between 
the estimates of the CRRA from financial economics and the estimates of the income-
elasticity of VSL, which suggest that individuals do not behave in a consistent way across 
markets. Such an inconsistency implies that a choice has to be made regarding the empirical 
source from which values of β will be extrapolated.   
Hence, in front of such incompatibilities between different empirical sources, it is worth 
discussing the reason why VSL estimates seem to be the most appropriate source for the 
present purpose. In my view, the voluminous literature on VSL empirical estimates 
constitutes definitely the ‘best’ source for the extrapolation of plausible values for the 
parameter β, because that literature concentrates precisely on the trade-off between longevity 
and consumption, which corresponds exactly to the central issue that governs the weighting 
exercise in the construction of longevity-adjusted income. It makes more sense, in the present 
context, to derive β from the VSL revealed by people’s decisions, than from how people 
behave on financial markets. Therefore the empirical literature on the VSL, despite its 
weaknesses (see infra), seems to be the most appropriate for the present purpose. 
Let us now consider how plausible values of β can be extrapolated from the VSL 
literature. As Usher argued, differentiating (4) with respect to C0 and Dt allows us to derive 
the marginal rate of substitution between a mortality rate Dt and current consumption C0:
26  
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, as Usher argued, can be eliminated from expression (15) by shortening 
the time periods enough that the probability of dying in any period is effectively zero. 
Expression (15), being the MRS between a mortality rate and current consumption, also 
corresponds to the price ratio between these two goods. Provided the price of current 
consumption is fixed to unity, one might interpret expression (15) as the value or shadow 
price of a reduction in the mortality rate Dt. If we impose (5) on (15), and if we ignore 1/(1-
D0)(1-Dt) in (15), we obtain the shadow price of a reduction in the current mortality rates: 
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Expression (16), which corresponds to the MRS between mortality risk and consumption, tells 
us how much consumption an individual would be willing to give up, at the margin, in order 
to benefit from a slight reduction in the probability of death (while keeping the same welfare 
as before). Alternatively, (16) can be regarded as giving the minimum (maximum) amount of 
consumption the representative agent would be willing to accept (pay) to suffer (benefit) from 
a rise (reduction) in the risk of death. As such, expression (16) will serve as a basis for the 
derivation of appropriate values for β. 
Expression (16) invites several comments. It tells us that the fall in consumption that 
would make the representative agent as well off as before while benefiting from a reduction in 
mortality depends negatively on β, and positively on Y and L. The negative influence of β on 
the representative agent’s willingness-to-pay for a reduction in the risk of death is hardly 
surprising: if β is high, then consumption is highly valued, so that the individual is not willing 
to pay a lot to benefit from a reduction in the risk of death. Alternatively, the lower the β, the 
less ‘materialistic’ the individual is, and thus the larger is the consumption the individual 
would accept to give up for a slight reduction in the risk of death. In a related way, the 
representative individual’s willingness-to-accept a higher risk of death decreases with β: if 
consumption is highly valued, then a small increase in consumption is sufficient in itself to 
compensate the individual for the increase in risk of death. If β is low, then a much larger 
compensation will be required for the deterioration of safety. Expression (16) also tells us 
that,  ceteris paribus, a higher income leads to a higher shadow price of a reduction in 
mortality. Such a positive relation is actually supported by large empirical evidence, which is 
not surprising: as Broome (1983) underlined, a richer person would always be willing to pay 
more to reduce risks, because money is simply less valuable for richer people.
27 Another 
corollary of expression (16) is that the shadow price of lower mortality would be increasing 
with (discounted) life expectancy, that is, decreasing with the age. The relation between VSL 
and age is a complex one. As Usher (1985) argued, there are, intuitively, two effects playing 
in opposite directions. On the one hand, the life expectancy of a younger person is higher, so 
that the young has ‘more to lose’ than the old, and would thus be willing to pay more. This 
effect is captured by (16).
28 However, on the other hand, older people actually face the highest 
mortality rates in the society, and these high mortality rates may make them value changes in 
mortality to a larger extent. As shown in the models of Jones-Lee (1976), and Weinstein et al 
(1980), the willingness-to-pay for a mortality reduction increases with the initial level of 
risk.
29 That second effect has also some intuitive support: as Broome (1983) underlined, an 
older person would be willing to pay more to reduce the risk of death, because his greater 
nearness to death makes money less valuable for him. But given the existence of two 
conflicting effects, what is suggested by empirical evidence? Actually, although empirical 
evidence supports the general hypothesis of age-dependency of VSL, it is inconclusive 
regarding the sign of the dependence: while Thaler and Rosen (1976), Maclean (1979), 
Viscusi (1979), Smith and Desvousges (1987), Corso et al (2001) and Hammitt and Liu 
(2003) estimated a negative effect of age on VSL over the whole lifespan (i.e. a decreasing 
VSL with the age at all ages, which supports expression (16)), Jones-Lee et al (1985), 
Johannesson et al (1997), Persson et al (2001), Aldy and Viscusi (2003) and Kniesner et al 
(2004) estimated an inverted-U relationship between age and VSL. Hence, although all 
studies agree on the fact that VSL diminishes during the second period of life (roughly 
speaking after 40 years), whether it is slightly increasing or already decreasing in the first half 
of life remains unknown.
30 While it might constitute an interesting extension of the present 
framework to account for a change in tastes with the age (i.e. a non-constant β over the   15 
 
 
lifetime), I tend to think that the assumption of decreasing VSL with the age, expressed in 
(16), seems to be, at the present day, the most plausible one. The reason for my scepticism 
regarding the estimated inverted-U relationships is that such estimates may reflect other 
effects, such as the fact that the young is less rich or is more subject to unemployment. If so, 
then it is not clear that adjusted growth rates should reflect such considerations. Hence we 
shall rely on the assumption of decreasing VSL with the age over the whole lifetime. 
In the light of expression (16), it is possible, for a given shadow price of lower 
mortality, and for given Y and L, to derive a plausible value for the parameter β. Expression 
(16) does not guarantee a positive imputation for a decrease in mortality risks. If people are 
risk-lovers (i.e. provided they could, people would require a positive compensation for a 
decrease in risk of death), then the left side of (16) becomes negative, implying a negative 
value for β and a negative adjustment for an increased longevity. It would make no sense to 
lower growth rates for a decrease in mortality, so that I shall regard risk-loving behaviour as 
something irrational that should not affect longevity-adjusted growth rates.
31 This exclusion 
of risk-loving behaviour underlines that the weights in adjusted growth rates are not 
completely democratic, because some structure (here, β strictly positive) has to be imposed on 
people’s preferences. The general question of the adequacy of the imposed structure is a 
major source of criticisms against the present framework (see Section 4). 
It should be stressed that the approach used in the present paper slightly differs from 
what Usher and Williamson suggested, on the grounds that an interval of plausible values for 
β will be selected by means of Miller’s (2000) rules of thumb, which express the VSL in an 
economy as a multiple of the level of real GDP per capita prevailing in that economy. Miller 
used data from 68 empirical studies (risk-wage studies, surveys and consumer behaviour 
studies) measuring the VSL across 13 countries in order to derive an interval of plausible 
values for VSL as multiples of real GDP per head. This method is especially interesting for 
extrapolating values of β when no VSL empirical estimate exists, as it seems to be the case for 
Belgium, as far as I know. Replacing the VSL by its notation in Usher’s framework 
(expression (16)), Miller’s rules of thumb are written: 
 
(17)   Y k
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where kH and kL correspond to the upper bound and lower bound parameters linking the VSL 
to real GDP per head Y. Expression (17) means that plausible values for VSL belong to the 
interval [kLY, kHY]. Expressions (16) and (17) provide us a range of plausible values for β: 
 
(18)   H L β β β ≤ ≤     or     L H k L k L / / ≤ ≤ β       
 
Expression (18) suggests that the choice of a value of reference for the population-weighted 
discounted life expectancy L is crucial for choosing values of βL and βH.
32 The value of L that 
seems the most adequate is the one prevailing at the time of the empirical estimates of VSL, 
and for the population structure prevailing at the time of the estimation. Then, for that year, 
and provided some discount rate is chosen, the values of kH and kL allow us to determine the 
preferences parameters βL and βH prevailing at the year of the estimation of VSL (by means of 
(18)). Throughout this paper, I shall assume that the values of βL and βH are constant over 
time. That assumption might seem strong, because this neglects empirically observed adaptive 
preferences (see Elster, 1985). However, two points should be stressed. Firstly, making the 
alternative assumption of changing preferences might not be adequate when measuring 
welfare changes over time, because variations of preferences due to changes in economical 
constraints can be regarded as some kind of irrationality, which should not influence the   16 
 
 
measurement of social well-being. Secondly, assuming the constancy of the preference 
parameters βL and βH over time is definitely not the same as assuming constant VSL over 
time: our assumption, which allows some conjoint growth of VSL and income over time, is 
not incompatible with empirical evidence of changing VSL over time, such as Costa and 
Kahn’s (2002) evidence of growing VSL over the second half of the 20th century in the U.S. 
The choice of a discount rate also involves the imposition, a priori, of some structure on 
people’s ‘raw’ preferences, and hence raises the general issue of the optimal degree of 
paternalism (see Broome, 1994). Although a large literature has been dedicated to the 
empirical study of time preferences, this is far from clear whether people’s own subjective 
discount rates should be used in the construction of adjusted growth rates. In order to address 
that issue, it is important to identify firstly the channels through which the discount rate 
affects the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework. The discount rate has two distinct 
influences: (1) it enters the informational basis L (population-weighted discounted life 
expectancy); (2) for a given VSL, r determines the value of βL and βH. Hence, a higher r will, 
ceteris paribus, imply a lower GL, but also a lower β leading to higher weights assigned to GL. 
Generally, the effect (2) slightly dominates (1), so that a higher discount rate usually leads to 
a slightly higher GŶ. The fact that (2) dominates (1) suggests that, within our framework, the 
discount rate should be better interpreted not as a rate of ‘pure’ time preferences (like in 
Usher), but rather as the expression of some myopia, for which a correction is introduced.
33 
Imposing that correction may appear paternalistic, so that I shall introduce a range of discount 
rates, each of these leading to some βL and βH derived by means of Miller’s rules of thumb. 
 
 
3: An application to Belgium: 1867-1997 
 
This section applies the Usher-Williamson-Miller method to Belgium over the period 
1867-1997. The sources of data and methodological remarks regarding the construction of the 
statistics are provided in the Appendix. As shown on Figure 3, mortality rates in Belgium 
have tended to fall over time since 1867, but with absolute changes varying across age groups. 
There seems to have been some convergence process working between mortality rates of 
extreme age groups (the highest mortality rates) and mortality rates of intermediate age 
groups (the lowest). For instance, while the mortality rate of people below 5 year-old was 8 
times higher than the mortality rate of people between 20 and 25 year-old in 1867, that ratio, 
in 1997, was only a 2:1 ratio, and thus it has been divided by 4 in a period of 130 years. 
As it was stressed in Section 2, the adjustment exercise requires several stages. The first 
stage consists of computing population-weighted discounted life expectancies for various 
discount rates and population structures. Discount rates are fixed to 0, 1 and 3 per cent. 
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Sources: Institut National de Statistiques (Belgium).
 
Plausible values for β are derived from the Miller’s (2000) values of kL and kH, which 
are respectively equal to 127 and 180 for Belgium. The value of L chosen for the computation 
of the β’s should ideally be the value of L at the year of the estimation exercise and for the 
discount rate r assumed. As far as I know, there is no direct estimation of VSL for Belgium. 
Nevertheless, Miller’s rules of thumb allow us to derive an interval of plausible values for 
VSL from empirical studies in other industrialized countries. VSL estimates from which 
Miller derived his rules of thumb were carried out over the period 1974-1999, so that it seems 
adequate to choose as a reference the average L over that period. Average population-
weighted discounted life expectancy (with 1981 age-structure) over the period 1974-1997 in 
Belgium was, for discount rates of 0, 1 and 3 per cent: 38.1, 30.1 and 20.6 years respectively. 
Dividing these by 180 and 127 gives the values of βL and βH in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Values of r, βL and βH 
 
     
 Discount  rate  r    
     
  r = 0.00  r = 0.01  r = 0.03 
     
βL  0.21 0.17 0.11 
     
βH  0.30 0.24 0.16 
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Regarding the choice of the parameter z, Williamson (1984) argued that z tends to 
increase with the level of development. Williamson’s argument is based on expression (13), 
where the correction for double-counting falls when Y*(t)/Y(t) falls. Given that the relative 
importance of the subsistence income is likely to fall with the level of development, it seems 
reasonable to deduce that z increases with the level of development. As far as the choice of a 
precise  z is concerned, the voluminous empirical literature on the sources of longevity 
produced no consensus – neither for developed nor for developing countries – on the effects 
of income growth on longevity, so that no obvious value for z seems to emerge.
34 In the light 
of Preston’s (1975) conclusion that income growth accounts for 10 to 25 per cent of growth in 
life expectancy, I shall choose 0.7 as the lower bound value for z. I shall fix z to 1, 0.8 and 0.7 
for the 1867-1945 period and the immediate post-war period, and to slightly higher values 
(1.0, 0.9 and 0.8) for the post-1960 period, corresponding to a later stage of Belgium’s 
economic expansion.  
Having selected age-distributions at some base years and values for parameters r, β and 
z, it is now possible to compute Usher-Williamson-Miller adjusted growth rates. Table 2 
presents adjusted growth rates over the period 1867-1945 by sub-periods, for population 
structures in 1866, 1890 and 1930, and for z equal to 1.0, 0.8 and 0.7. GY refers to the annual 
average compound growth rate of real GDP per head. GŶ refers to the annual average 
compound growth rate adjusted for changes in population-weighted discounted life 
expectancy. For each period and for each value of the exogeneity parameter z, annual average 
compound growth rates inclusive of an imputation for changes in longevity are computed for 
various combinations of r (0, 1 and 3 per cent) and β (lower bound and upper bound values 
from Table 1). Table 2 provides for each period the minimum and the maximum adjusted 
growth rate and its average value (denoted by Av GŶ). The bottom of Table 2 also shows the 
average of GŶ over population structures (denoted by TAv GŶ) and the two bounds of the 
adjustment interval. However, when making interpretations, more emphasis should be laid on 
the adjusted figures (in bold in the table) under the population structure prevailing over the 
sub-period considered. 
 













                         
 z=1.0 z=0.8 z=0.7 z=1.0 z=0.8 z=0.7 z=1.0 z=0.8 z=0.7 z=1.0 z=0.8 z=0.7 z=1.0 z=0.8 z=0.7 
Av GY  1.200 1.200 1.200 1.008 1.008 1.008  -0.230  -0.230  -0.230  1.315  1.315  1.315  -2.840  -2.840 -2.840
W1866                          
min GŶ  1.309 1.287 1.276 1.831 1.666 1.584  1.123  0.852  0.717  1.872  1.761  1.705  -3.527  -3.389 -3.321
max GŶ  1.421 1.377 1.354 2.505 2.206 2.056  2.021  1.571  1.346  2.430  2.207  2.095  -3.095  -3.044 -3.019
Av GŶ  1.356 1.325 1.309 2.135  1.910  1.797  1.542 1.188 1.011 2.115 1.955 1.875 -3.273 -3.187 -3.144
                         
W1890                          
min GŶ  1.301 1.281 1.271 1.837 1.671 1.588  1.108  0.840  0.707  1.866  1.756  1.701  -3.573  -3.426 -3.353
max GŶ  1.408 1.366 1.345 2.517 2.215 2.064  1.972  1.532  1.311  2.422  2.201  2.090  -3.107  -3.054 -3.027
Av GŶ  1.346 1.316 1.302 2.144 1.917 1.803  1.514  1.165  0.991  2.108 1.950 1.870 -3.299 -3.207 -3.161
                         
W1930                          
min GŶ  1.283 1.266 1.258 1.778 1.624 1.547  1.169  0.889  0.749  1.761  1.671  1.627  -3.146  -3.085 -3.054
max GŶ  1.357 1.325 1.310 2.421 2.138 1.997  2.179  1.697  1.456  2.192  2.017  1.929  -2.924  -2.907 -2.899
Av GŶ  1.314 1.291 1.280 2.067 1.855 1.749  1.633  1.260  1.074  1.950 1.823 1.759 -3.013 -2.979 -2.961
                         
Av GY  1.200 1.200 1.200 1.008 1.008 1.008  -0.230  -0.230  -0.230  1.315  1.315  1.315  -2.840  -2.840 -2.840
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Several observations can be made in the light of Table 2. Firstly, the size of the 
adjustments does not seem to vary a lot according to the population structure chosen for 
computing population-weighted discounted life expectancies, so that our results seem robust 
regarding the choice of population structures. Another, general remark is that, except for the 
period 1939-1945, adjustments are positive. Hence conventional economic growth rates may 
have tended to underestimate the increase in social well-being that occurred in Belgium over 
the period considered. Moreover, the underestimation of well-being changes seems to be non-
negligible. In particular, the size of the adjustments remains significant, even when the 
exogeneity parameter z takes its lowest value, so that the double-counting criticism is not 
sufficient, per se, to justify the absence of adjustment for changes in longevity. Furthermore, 
the sensitivity to the chosen VSL seems non-negligible. Another observation is that the size of 
the adjustments is not identical over time. Exactly as there are phases of fast or slow GDP 
growth, there exist periods of rapid improvements in longevity and periods of relative 
slowdown. Hence it is worth looking at the size of the adjustments for each sub-period. 
Regarding period 1867-1881, Table 2 suggests that, if we take the age-distribution of 
population in 1866 as a reference, the adjusted growth rate lies between 1.3 and 1.4 per cent, 
according to the assumed value of z.
35 The unadjusted growth rate over that period being 1.2 
per cent, our computations suggest that adjusted and unadjusted GDP growth rates provide 
relatively similar pictures of the changes in social well-being over that period. Our diagnosis 
differs regarding the period 1881-1911, for which the size of the adjustments lies between 0.8 
and 1.2 per cent of annual growth (on average), according to the value chosen for z (with 1890 
weights). Hence the conventional GDP growth rate, equal to 1.0 per cent, may have 
underestimated the actual changes in social well-being that took place during that period. 
However, it should be stressed that the Usher-Williamson-Miller adjusted growth rates, as the 
unadjusted ones, are average measures, and thus do not tell us anything about the distribution 
of welfare in general – and about the distribution of improvements in longevity in particular – 
among the population. As I shall argue in Section 4, the ignorance of distributive aspects 
constitutes a serious shortcoming of longevity-adjusted growth rates. Over the period 1881-
1911, although the sensitivity of the adjustments to the value of z is non-negligible, there is 
still a non-negligible annual adjustment of 0.8 per cent when z is equal to 0.7. The period 
1911-1921 is a singular period, and the unavailability of annual data does not allow us to have 
a precise measure of the annual adjusted growth rates. I will not pay too much attention to 
those average figures, which certainly hide the large annual variations that took place in the 
middle of the decade because of World War One (1914-1918). For periods with such 
volatility in longevity, average figures are definitely unsatisfactory. Adjusted growth rates for 
the period 1921-1939 lie between 1.8 and 2 per cent (with 1930 population structure), 
depending on the parameter z. The adjustment amounts here to at least 0.5 per cent of annual 
growth, which is non-negligible. Hence conventional GDP growth rates may have tended to 
underestimate the increase in social well-being that took place during the interwar period. 
However, the comment I made above regarding the neglect of the distributive aspects holds 
here as well. The last three columns of Table 2 present annual average compound adjusted 
growth rates during the World War Two period. As for World War One, annual data would be 
definitely more adequate for such a period of high volatility in mortality. 
The adjustment exercise for the second half of the 20th century (Table 3) is based on 
population weights from years 1930, 1961, 1970 and 1981. Parameters βL and βH keep the 
same values as above.
36 
Conventional economic growth rates seem to have underestimated the increase in social 
well-being during the period 1945-1997: while average unadjusted growth rates lie 
approximately between 1.8 and 4.4 per cent according to the sub-period considered, average 
adjusted growth rates lie approximately between 2.8 and 5.8 per cent. This implies that the   20 
 
 
average annual size of adjustment, over the entire post-war period, lies between 1 and 1.5 per 
cent. Those figures suggest an average annual adjustment of a substantial size, and, on 
average, of a much larger size than over the period 1867-1945, for which the size of the 
average adjustment rarely exceeded 1 per cent. Therefore the underestimation of well-being 
changes by usual growth rates seems to have been more serious during the second half of the 
20th century. Moreover, adjustments remain substantial even for low values of z. 
Furthermore, although the sensitivity of adjusted figures to the chosen population structures is 
also low, the dependence on the assumed VSL remains non-negligible. It should also be 
stressed that, as in Table 2, the adjustment sizes largely differ across periods: these are large 
over the period 1945-1960, smaller over 1960-1974, and significant over 1974-1997. 
 








           
 z=1.0 z=0.8 z=0.7 z=1.0 z=0.9 z=0.8 z=1.0 z=0.9 z=0.8 
GY  3.163 3.163 3.163 4.397 4.397 4.397 1.816 1.816 1.816 
W1930           
min  GŶ  5.166 4.773 4.575 4.873 4.828 4.781 2.803 2.705 2.606 
max  GŶ  6.681 6.000 5.655 5.182 5.109 5.034 3.450 3.288 3.126 
Av  GŶ  5.856 5.331 4.986 5.017 4.958 4.899 3.106 2.978 2.850 
           
W1961           
min  GŶ  5.164 4.771 4.574 4.878 4.832 4.785 2.819 2.719 2.619 
max  GŶ  6.665 5.988 5.646 5.208 5.132 5.055 3.536 3.366 3.195 
Av  GŶ  5.848 5.326 5.062 5.030 4.970 4.909 3.148 3.016 2.884 
           
W1970           
min  GŶ  5.138 4.751 4.556 4.875 4.829 4.783 2.820 2.720 2.620 
max GŶ  6.621 5.953 5.615 5.204 5.129 5.053 3.546 3.374 3.203 
Av  GŶ  5.814 5.299 5.038 4.932 4.967 4.907 3.152 3.020 2.887 
           
W1981              
min GŶ  5.109 4.728 4.536 4.877 4.831 4.785 2.827 2.726 2.625 
max GŶ  6.587 5.927 5.592 5.209 5.134 5.057 3.556 3.384 3.211 
Av  GŶ  5.782 5.273 5.016 5.030 4.970 4.910 3.161 3.028 2.894 
           
GY  3.163 3.163 3.163 4.397 4.397 4.397 1.816 1.816 1.816 





















           
 
Adjusted growth rates during the period 1945-1960 lie between 5 and 5.8 per cent (with 
1930 population structure), according to the value of z. Although the usual growth rate is high 
(3.2 per cent), this leaves us with a substantial adjustment of between 1.8 and 2.6 per cent of 
annual growth. Longevity-adjusted growth rates suggest that the well-being changes that 
actually took place during that period would have been almost twice higher than measured by 
conventional GDP growth rates. Whatever the value of z, the immediate post-war recovery 
may have been seriously underestimated by usual measures of growth. Adjustments seem to 
be much smaller over the period 1960-1974: while the average annual GDP growth is 4.4 per 
cent, adjusted growth rates do not exceed 5.1 per cent. This constitutes a surprise, because one 
might expect significant improvements in longevity during that period. However, this simply 
reflects that progress in population-weighted discounted life expectancy was less strong 
during that period than over the other sub-periods. Table 3 also suggests an important 
qualification regarding Belgium’s recent economic history. Historical studies of Belgium’s 
post-war economic development usually emphasize that the post-war growth was especially 
high during the Golden Sixties period, with a strong acceleration of productivity growth, but 
then declined after 1974. The post-1974 period is thus often regarded as a period of relative 
growth crisis or economic slowdown, even though, as Cassiers, De Villé and Solar (1996)   21 
 
 
underlined, the slowdown was definitely more serious for some of Belgium’s neighbours. 
Although Table 3 does not contradict the usual view of Belgium’s economic history, adjusted 
growth rates tend to qualify it. These suggest that, once changes in the length of life are taken 
into account, the post-1974 growth slowdown seems to have been less severe, so that the 
growth gap between periods 1960-1974 and 1974-1997 might be less sizeable than usually 
measured (whatever the precise division between sub-periods). As a consequence of non-
negligible adjustments over the latter period (between 1 to 1.3 per cent of annual growth, 
according to the value of z), the growth gap between periods 1960-1974 and 1974-1997, equal 
to 2.5 per cent in unadjusted terms, is reduced to approximately 1.9 per cent in terms of 
adjusted growth rates. Therefore, it seems that conventional growth measures may have led to 
an overestimation of the growth gap between the Golden Sixties and the post-1974 period. 
 
 
4: Criticisms against the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework 
 
Do adjusted figures constitute underestimates or overestimates of real changes in social 
well-being? As I shall discuss in this Section, there exist several good reasons to think in both 
directions. But before considering specific criticisms against the Usher-Williamson-Miller 
framework, some preliminary remarks should be made regarding the use of the – very 
controversial – value of a statistical life (VSL) in the present work. 
 
General criticisms against the value of a statistical life (VSL) 
 
As it was stressed above, the size of the adjustment for longevity improvement is 
significantly dependent on whether the lower bound or the upper bound estimate is used for 
the value of a statistical life. In other words, longevity-adjusted growth rates are – not 
surprisingly – sensitive to the ‘pricing’ aspect of the adjustment exercise. The dependence of 
longevity-adjusted growth rates on the VSL chosen for the correction is a source of criticisms, 
because the concept of VSL, introduced by Schelling (1968), is controversial.
37 While the 
main advantage of the VSL is to allow economists to replace the compensation for death 
(infinite) by the compensation for an increased risk of death (finite), Broome (1978a, 1985) 
argued that such an indirect procedure does not make the issue of valuing a whole life 
disappear: if it is worth spending x pounds to save a person from a chance p of dying, then it 
is also worth spending x/p pounds to save that person from a certain death. Moreover, Broome 
underlined that considering a statistical death – instead of the certain death of a particular 
person – does not make a big difference from a moral point of view. Independently of 
estimation issues (see infra), the use of VSL has also been widely criticized on other grounds. 
As Usher (1980) underlined, the use of a single VSL estimate in a normative context might be 
problematic, because mortality rates are private commodities, whose ‘prices’ may vary 
substantially across people according to factors such as the age, income, unionisation, culture, 
initial level of risk and kind of risk (see Jones-Lee, 1989; Viscusi, 2003).
38 But what is true 
for normative analysis also holds in the context of measurement of social welfare changes 
over time. Hence the present approach, which relies on the assumption of a unique ‘price’, 
may simplify the picture. Moreover, as Bailey (1968) and Viscusi (1993) underlined, the 
willingness-to-pay approach is a marginalist approach, so that estimated trade-off values 
between risks and money are pertinent only in a local range (i.e. these are ‘in the 
neighbourhood’ kind of calculations’). Hence VSL estimates should be regarded as valid 
‘prices’ for marginal changes in longevity, but only as approximations of the true ‘prices’ for 
the valuation of larger changes in mortality conditions (e.g. the immediate post-war period).   22 
 
 
But besides those criticisms, the empirical estimation of VSL has also been criticized on 
numerous grounds. I shall distinguish here between, on the one hand, general criticisms, 
which hold for all kinds of estimates, whatever these are derived by means of labour market 
studies (i.e. risk-wages trade-offs), consumer behaviour studies (i.e. purchase of safety-
goods), or from the contingent valuation method (i.e. surveys), and, on the other hand, 
criticisms that are specific to a particular method. 
A first general criticism against all VSL empirical studies is that these are (most often) 
based on the assumption of perfect rationality (see Viscusi, 1993). Such an assumption is very 
strong, especially in the context of decision-making under uncertainty, as it was shown by 
Jones-Lee  et al (1995). Another problem is the one raised by the assumption of perfect 
knowledge and/or perfect perception of the risks. Regarding the latter assumption, it is a well-
known fact that people exhibit a tendency to overestimate the occurrence of small risks and to 
underestimate the occurrence of large risks (see Fischoff et al, 1981; Jones-Lee, 1989). 
Individuals have also generally some difficulties to deal with small numbers, and with 
changes in small numbers (see Fromm, 1968; Viscusi, 1993). A main source of troubles 
concerns the observed gap between the willingness-to-accept (WTA) – i.e. the minimum 
compensation people would accept – and the willingness-to-pay (WTP) – i.e. the maximum 
price people would be willing to pay – for a change in risk of death of equal size (see Shogren 
et al, 1994). While such a gap is not specific to the good under study, the fact that people 
require more compensation for a slight increase in the risk of death than they would be willing 
to pay to benefit from an equal reduction in the mortality rate is problematic, because these 
should be identical in principle.
39 Another problem concerns the definition of the relevant 
VSL estimate: should it be the VSL estimated ex ante (before the determination of the risk 
status) or ex post (after that determination)? Actually, as stressed by Weinstein et al (1980) 
and Rosen (1981), the ex ante and ex post VSL estimates might vary substantially.
40   
But each method has also its own shortcomings. Labour market and consumer behaviour 
studies, being revealed preferences techniques, face the problem that an observed choice 
might result from various motivations and sets of preferences, so that the inference of 
preferences from observed behaviour is problematic (Sen, 1973b). For instance, the 
identification of the risk premium on labour market constitutes a difficult task (see Viscusi, 
1992, 1993, 2003). What we face here is the general possibility of an omitted variable bias 
affecting the validity of the estimated VSL. For instance, several jobs have non-monetary 
advantages, which, if omitted, may lead to an underestimation of the ‘true’ ‘price’ of higher 
risks of death. Another source of difficulty lies in the fact that workers exhibit some 
heterogeneity in front of risks. Moreover, the assumptions of perfect knowledge and perfect 
perception of the risks is also questionable. Compared to risk-wage studies, for which the two 
components of the trade-off (wages and risks levels) can be observed, consumer behaviour 
studies exhibit the additional drawback that most often either the risk level or the value of the 
monetary component cannot be observed. The contingent valuation method also exhibits 
several weaknesses.
41 Firstly, there is a non-negligible sensitivity of the answers to the precise 
way in which the questions are asked. ‘Framing effects’ of various kinds exist, such as the 
‘starting point bias’(see Mitchell and Carson, 1989).
42 There also exist non-negligible 
‘embedding effects’: when the WTP for a good is inferred from the WTP for a more inclusive 
good, then the WTP for the good in question is lower than if its WTP is estimated separately 
(see Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992a,b). Secondly, respondents may have incentives to 
misrepresent their WTP, that is, to provide deliberately false answers, leading to ‘strategic 
bias’ (i.e. attempt to influence the provision of the good or the level of individual payment for 
it), or ‘compliance bias’ (i.e. false answers to satisfy the sponsor or the interviewer). Thirdly, 
respondents might misunderstand the question and answer another one (see Johansson, 1995).   23 
 
 
It follows from this that VSL empirical estimates – whatever the precise estimation procedure 
– are imperfect, so that these should be generally treated with extreme caution. 
However, despite the numerous criticisms against the VSL, one should not exaggerate 
the fragility of the Usher-Williamson-Miller growth rates. Five points should be stressed here. 
Firstly, one should keep in mind that the VSL is nothing else than a shadow price, 
whose significance, as the one of any price, is quite limited. As Usher (1980) pointed out:
43 
 
‘[…] by value of life, I mean nothing more than the amount one would pay per unit for a decrease in one’s 
mortality rate in the current year. The statement that the price of life is $200,000 in this sense does not 
mean that a man would sacrifice his life for $200,000, any more than the statement that the price of butter 
is $0,25 per pound means that a man would pay $200,000 for the pleasure of consuming 400 tons of 
butter.’    
 
Although it does not make Broome’s critiques irrelevant, Usher’s remark emphasizes that one 
should not regard the VSL as more than what it is, that is, as more than a price for a 
transaction that never takes place, no person being willing to sell his life, whatever the price. 
Secondly, it seems to me that an indirect measure of the value of longevity – even if that 
measure is imperfect – is better than no measure at all. Hence, what criticisms suggest is not 
that Usher-Williamson-Miller measures should be rejected, but rather that these would 
definitely benefit from future progress made in the empirical estimations of VSL.  
Thirdly, it should be kept in mind that the use of VSL in this paper differs from its use in 
the context of cost-benefit analysis, where VSL estimates have direct (future) policy 
implications. For our measurement purpose, a finite value has to be assigned to the length of 
life. Otherwise, any increase in life expectancy would have an infinite value, so that adjusted 
growth rates would always be infinite, making imputations for changes in life expectancy 
meaningless. Hence the present measurement purpose requires a finite value to be given to a 
change in mortality rates. 
Fourthly, the relative fragility of the present framework is inherent to the use of weights 
that are more ‘democratic’ than the ones used in indicators such as the HDI, which may be 
regarded as somewhat arbitrary (see Dasgupta, 1993). Taking people’s preferences into 
account raises numerous difficulties, because preferences cannot be observed easily and might 
be irrational. As the difficult choice of values for parameters β and r suggest, people’s raw 
preferences cannot be taken as such as a basis for the imputation exercise, so that weights are 
only relatively democratic, but not absolutely democratic. This is hard to know to what extent 
some account should be taken of people’s myopia or misinformation. However, those 
difficulties do not justify the rejection of preferences-based weights, but, rather, raise the 
complex issue of what kind of structure should be imposed a priori on people’s raw 
preferences (see Broome, 1994).  
Fifthly, VSL estimates might well be controversial, but the use, in the Usher-
Williamson-Miller method, of a relatively large interval of VSL estimates provides – at least 
to some extent – some immunization against practical criticisms. 
In the light of those arguments, one should not overestimate the consequences of the 
imperfections of VSL on the validity of VSL-based adjusted measures. However, it remains 
true that the concept and measurement of VSL could be improved.  
 
The narrow conception of individual well-being in the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework 
 
A first criticism against the Usher-Williamson-Miller method is that it completely 
ignores the intrinsic value of longevity, i.e. the value of longevity in itself, independently of 
the value of any activity or consumption that is allowed by longevity.
 In the theoretical model, 
the length of life has an instrumental value only: an additional life-year is only valued to the   24 
 
 
extent that it allows the representative individual to consume more goods and services. The 
question raised here is whether or not that assumption is plausible.
44 But for our measurement 
purposes, what we need to know is the exact measure of the intrinsic value of longevity. From 
the answer to that question depends the size of the downward bias in the adjusted growth 
rates. The bias in our estimates might be non-negligible, depending on the extent to which 
VSL estimates already account for the intrinsic value of longevity. 
Secondly, the Usher-Williamson-Miller model is based on a very restrictive conception 
of life, in the sense that it focuses only on the ‘materialistic’ side of life: individual’s lifetime 
utility is assumed to be derived from consumption only (see Linnerooth, 1979). However, a 
life cannot be reduced to a period of consumption: utility can be derived from non-market 
activities, such as, for instance, sleeping in a park or looking at a setting sun. Although (free) 
leisure time is an important component of welfare, the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework 
neglects it. For instance, adjusted growth rates cannot discriminate between having one 
additional year of working life or one additional year of retired life (provided consumption is 
identical in each case).
45 It is difficult to know the precise size of the downward bias in the 
estimates, bias which depends on the extent to which VSL estimates are themselves biased.
46 
It might be possible to broaden the definition of individual welfare by introducing other 
arguments in the utility function (e.g. leisure time). However, as Mishan (1982) argued, some 
problems would arise when one would try to extrapolate the shadow price of lower mortality 
rates, because one can only estimate the non-materialistic side of life by firstly estimating the 
value of life by conventional methods, and then by subtracting from it the value of lifetime 
consumption.
47 More generally, as Nordhaus (2000) underlined, the valuation of non-market 
activities is one of the main challenges for future improvements of national accounts. That 
challenge, which involves the quality of life dimension and not the mere length aspect, goes 
beyond the scope of the present paper.
48 
Thirdly, as it was stressed above, a potential source of upward bias lies in the possibility 
of overestimating the effect of consumption and longevity on individual welfare. Actually, 
some empirical evidence supports the fact that welfare may be more ‘relative’, in the sense 
that individuals value their consumption and longevity in the light of some standards, which  
may correspond to what other people enjoy, or to what they enjoyed themselves in the past.
49 
If this is true, then adjusted growth rates may overestimate the actual size of the welfare 
change. However, empirical evidence also shows that absolute achievements matter (see 
supra), so that the size of the upward bias might not be so large. Moreover, the relevancy of 
‘relative’ standards for the measurement of social welfare changes over time can also be 
questioned: does it really matter if people are ‘stuck’ to a particular standard of reference? 
Although the answer to that question is not obvious, it might be worth developing an 
alternative, general framework accounting for habits formation, in which individual welfare 
would not only depend on absolute current achievements, but also on the comparison of those 
achievements with what was achieved in the past. There is no place here to develop such a 
framework, but it should be stressed that the extent to which the derived adjusted measures 
differ from the present one definitely depends on the precise specification of the ‘relativity’ of 
welfare, and on the assumptions on individual expectations (see the Appendix). 
Fourthly, while the expected utility hypothesis can be defended on ‘paternalistic’ 
grounds (see supra), the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework also relies on strong 
assumptions regarding the precise ways in which the representative agent forms his 
expectations regarding future consumption flows and future survival probabilities. In 
particular, the present framework is based on the implicit assumption of a complete 
independence of valuations from the past experienced welfare. While the independence from 
the past can be justified on paternalistic grounds (i.e. the measurement of welfare change 
between two periods should be independent of the welfare associated to a period that is very   25 
 
 
distant in the past), the inclusion of expected future consumption flows and survival 
probabilities is more problematic, on two distinct grounds. First, those consumption flows and 
survival probabilities are future, that is, not yet experienced by individuals, so that one may be 
reluctant to make an indicator of social well-being changes dependent on non-experienced 
things, even in the hypothetical case in which the future would be perfectly known. Second, 
the future is unknown, so that one might also argue that a measure of social welfare changes 
should not be dependent on expectations, which might be of bad quality: should a rise in 
optimism be counted as a welfare gain? The previous remarks suggest that the Usher-
Williamson-Miller framework might exhibit some upward bias, in the sense that the actual 
welfare gain might be lower than measured. However, here again, one might defend the 
assumptions made on paternalistic grounds: even if people do not feel better off to that extent, 
because, for instance, these people are myopic or risk-lovers, the adjusted growth rate 
suggests that people should value the passage from one period to the other in the precise way 
in which these measures value it. 
Fifthly, adjusted growth rates neglect the external effects of longevity. As Fromm 
(1968) underlined, there exist external effects of an individual’s continued existence on the 
lives of his familial contemporaries. However, those are neglected by the Usher-Williamson-
Miller framework, which assumes that the representative consumer’s welfare does not depend 
on the existence of other people. Such a strong assumption might have led to an 
underestimation of the value of lower mortality. According to Needleman (1976) and Jones-
Lee (1976), one can avoid the downward bias by using in the evaluation not only a person’s 
own willingness-to-pay for an increased safety, but also what other people (family and 
friends) would be willing to pay for an increased safety of that person. However, as 
Linnerooth (1982) underlined, adding the values assigned by others as a correction might lead 
to some double-counting, because in his valuation of his own life, the individual may already 
take others’ feelings and values into account.
50 Moreover, as Bergstrom (1982) and Jones-Lee 
(1991, 1992) pointed out, the adequate correction depends ultimately on the precise nature of 
the welfare interdependencies, which can be of different kinds (‘pure altruism’, ‘pure 
paternalistic altruism’, ‘safety-focused altruism’, etc.). Furthermore, this is not clear that the 
downward bias is so large. For instance, Needleman (1976) concluded from his estimations of 
a range of ‘coefficients of concern’ (i.e. the ratio of the amount of money that an individual A 
would be willing to pay to reduce the risk of death of an individual B, over the amount he 
would be willing to pay for himself in the same situation) that these coefficients were equal to 
1/10, in the case of parents with respect to their children, and even less in the reverse case 
(1/30). However, Jones-Lee (1992) suggested that accounting for the values assigned by other 
people would make the VSL larger of 10 to 40 %, which implies the existence of a non-
negligible downward bias in our estimates due to the neglect of welfare interdependencies.
51  
 
The narrow conceptions of social well-being within the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework 
 
Beyond the restrictive assumptions on individual well-being, the Usher-Williamson-
Miller framework also relies on strong assumptions on social well-being. 
Firstly, adjusted growth rates neglect the external effects of survival not only on 
individual welfare, but also on the whole society and on future generations. Strictly speaking, 
those effects are infinite: when a young person’s life is saved, the lives of his or her potential 
future children and grand-children are also saved (see Parfit, 1984). As Fromm (1968) and 
Broome (1992) underlined, prolonging a person’s life and adding a new life are alternative 
ways of doing the same thing, so that the problems of valuing a longer life and a larger 
population cannot be treated separately. Broome’s (1985) rejection of the willingness-to-pay 
approach is deduced from the conjunction of three statements: (1) current changes in mortality   26 
 
 
affect future population, (2) there is no objective reason for neglecting future people and (3) 
there exists no satisfactory theoretical bases for valuing population changes. Although 
Broome’s criticism is well-founded, it should be stressed that neither the difficulties faced by 
population ethics nor the fact that population effects are unknown do necessarily imply a 
rejection of the valuation of longer lives. Moreover, the time horizon restriction, although 
ethically unjustified, cannot be avoided here, because of our measurement purposes. 
Secondly, another important point should be stressed regarding demographic effects: the 
existence of interdependencies between generations. According to Arthur (1981), the effects 
of a decrease in age-specific mortality rates on social welfare are most often overestimated by 
the willingness-to-pay approach, which ignores that the prolongation of life is not costless: 
longer lives mean larger lifetime consumptions, and this must be financed by younger 
workers. Actually, the cost of ageing is ignored by the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework, 
which is a representative agent model that hides the social heterogeneity between workers and 
non-workers. More precisely, longevity-adjusted growth rates are based on the assumption 
that consumption will remain at its current level in the future, despite the potential ageing of 
the population. Such a separation between longevity conditions and the ‘material’ conditions 
is actually very strong because, in the long run, it might be the case that consumption could 
not remain constant without a longer working time for the members of the ageing society. 
Hence ignoring intergenerational interdependencies might have led to a non-negligible 
upward bias.  
Thirdly, a strong criticism against Usher-Williamson-Miller adjusted growth rates is that 
these are national average measures that might hide large inequalities in income and longevity 
among the population. Actually, the figures presented in Section 3, being in per capita terms, 
tell us nothing about the distribution of income and longevity at the different points in time. 
For instance, these figures do not tell us anything about the distribution of longevity gains 
between different categories of workers (blue collars and white collars). Those disparities 
might have been substantial, so that adjusted growth rates may hide large inequalities in 
longevity between groups (defined by categories such as gender, location, race, socio-
economic class, etc). Neglecting information on the distribution of income and longevity 
among the population is not desirable if one considers, like Morris (1979), that a good social 
well-being indicator should take into account inequalities on the spaces considered.
 Therefore 
an extension of the Usher-Williamson-Miller indicator, accounting also for changes in intra-
country inequalities in income and life expectancy, is desirable. However, incorporating 
inequalities in longevity would raise several difficulties. Firstly, as Sen (1993) underlined, 
inequalities in longevity differ from inequalities in income, and thus require particular 
treatments: life expectancy is, by definition, an ‘average’ figure: no individual can have a life 
expectancy in the same way as that individual has some income. Moreover, intra-country and 
inter-country income inequalities are larger than the corresponding inequalities in life 
expectancy.
52 Secondly, some difficulties might arise regarding the theoretical foundations of 
such an inequality-sensitive measure. For instance, as Sen (1993) pointed out, this is not clear 
that the efficiency argument for equality could be easily transposed in the longevity space. 
Thirdly, data on longevity inequalities at the individual level may be unavailable. Although 
that difficulty may be overcome by making adequate assumptions on the relation between 
inequalities in income and inequalities in health (see Deaton, 1999), the relation between 
those inequalities is not well-known, so that serious difficulties remain regarding the 
availability of the data.  
Fourthly, one might argue that Williamson’s (1984) treatment of the double-counting 
issue is imperfect, and that some double-counting remains. For instance, one could argue that 
we should add the adjustment term for growth in life expectancy not to the real GDP per head 
growth, but rather to the growth in the real GDP per head net of inputs used in the production   27 
 
 
of longevity, because expenditures on health and education, which are already counted within 
national accounts, have contributed to a large extent to the growth in longevity. Nevertheless, 
two points should be stressed. Firstly, to the extent that the amounts of expenditures on health 
and education depend on income, the Williamson correction for double-counting is sufficient, 
because expenditures on health and education might be regarded as the channels by which 
income affects longevity, so an income-based correction for double-counting is roughly the 
same as correcting for double-counting by means of direct inputs (it might be even better if 
many other income-dependent inputs affect longevity). Moreover, in the realistic case where 
expenditures on health and education depend on income, subtracting these from the real GDP 
and then adding the adjustment term to the growth in the net real GDP per head would lead us 
to an under-counting. Secondly, a treatment of the double-counting issue based on inputs 
would raise many difficulties, because, as Nordhaus (1998) argued, a substantial part of inputs 
generate several outputs (e.g. comfort). Furthermore, as Usher (1973a) emphasized, a large 
number of expenditures may potentially influence life expectancy, so that trying to avoid 
double-counting by subtracting those expenditures would be endless. Hence the Williamson 
correction for double-counting remains appealing on pragmatic grounds. 
 
Underestimates or overestimates? 
 
To summarize, it is hard to know whether the computed adjusted growth rates constitute 
underestimates or overestimates. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the neglects of non-market 
activities, welfare interdependencies, intergenerational transfers and inequalities seem to be 
more important than the others. Moreover, the sources of bias play in opposite directions, so 
that, if there is some error of estimation, as it is probably the case, then this should be of 
relatively limited size, because of the cancellation of the different bias. Furthermore, the 
relative importance of the different bias may have varied over time. For instance, inequalities 
in income and longevity might have risen to a larger extent in the 19th century than after 
World War Two (see Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002). It follows from all this that the sign 
of the total bias and its net size may vary over time, because several neglected effects may 





In conclusion, the following points should be stressed. 
Firstly, the relevancy of a social well-being indicator accounting for changes in 
longevity cannot be overemphasized. The length of life is a central component of human well-
being, which a good indicator should not ignore. Usual criticisms do not stand up to close 
scrutiny and thus cannot justify the neglect of longevity. Moreover, there is a need to 
complement existing indicators accounting for changes in life expectancy, but which are 
based on somewhat arbitrary weights (e.g. United Nations’ HDI). 
Secondly, the Usher-Williamson-Miller method is based on strong assumptions on both 
individual and social welfares. Those assumptions (e.g. additive-separability at the individual 
level, ‘average person’ at the social level, constancy of preferences over time) should be kept 
in mind when looking at the computed adjusted figures. One should also notice that several 
postulates, such as the expected utility hypothesis, the neglect of habituation mechanisms, and 
the assumption of ‘neutral’ expectations (i.e. reflecting achieved progress), are not justified on 
empirical, descriptive grounds, but, rather, those assumptions draw their legitimacy from 
‘paternalistic’ considerations, regarding how people should make their valuations. This 
suggests that Usher-Williamson-Miller adjusted growth rates correspond more to measures of   28 
 
 
how a – specifically defined – ‘rational’ representative agent should have valued changes in 
basic standards of living, rather than measures of how a hypothetical individual would have 
valued those changes. 
Thirdly, the computation of adjusted growth rates for Belgium over the period 1867-
1997 leads us to the following findings. (1) Growth rates adjusted for changes in longevity 
generally differ – at least to a non-negligible extent – from conventional real GDP growth 
rates. (2) The sign of the adjustment is, generally, positive, suggesting that usual growth 
figures might have underestimated the increase in social well-being. (3) The size of the 
adjustments remains substantial even when some endogeneity of longevity is allowed. (4) The 
size of the adjustments differs across periods. (5) Adjusted growth rates also allow us to 
qualify the usual version of Belgium’s post-war economic history, by suggesting that the 
growth gap between the Golden Sixties and the post-1974 period may have been much 
smaller than usually measured. (6) Our results are robust with respect to the population 
structures chosen as references. (7) The size of the adjustments depends to a non-negligible 
extent on the VSL used, justifying the use of an interval of VSL rather than a unique estimate. 
Fourthly, several criticisms can be made against the Usher-Williamson-Miller approach. 
(1) The concept of VSL, which is used in order to determine the weights assigned to changes 
in longevity, can be severely criticized on theoretical and practical grounds. However, for our 
measurement purposes, those difficulties can be regarded as the price to pay for having a 
social well-being indicator based on (more) democratic weights. Moreover, its practical 
shortcomings can be partly overcome by using an interval of VSL. (2) The Usher-
Williamson-Miller framework neglects the intrinsic value of longevity. (3) It can be accused 
of relying on a narrow, ‘materialistic’ conception of life. (4) It neglects the relativity of 
welfare judgements. (5) It relies on strong assumptions on people’s expectations. (6) It 
neglects the value assigned to someone’s life by other people. (7) It neglects population 
effects. (8) It ignores intergenerational transfers. (9) Adjusted growth rates, being average 
measures, may hide large inequalities on the aspects of well-being considered. In the light of 
those criticisms, this is hard to know whether adjusted figures constitute under- or 
overestimates of actual social well-being changes. 
Fifthly, it seems to me that, thanks to their richer informational basis, longevity-adjusted 
growth rates constitute promising indicators to complement usual growth measures in the 
study of social well-being evolution over time. The widening of the informational basis in 
order to account for changes in longevity, by providing an original and more complete picture 
of social welfare changes, definitely generates some extra-value. However, it is undeniably 
true that the incorporation of longevity changes into national accounts statistics raises 
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6: Appendix 1: The Usher-Williamson-Miller model 
 
Derivation of expression (4) 
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The first term is equal to C0
β(1-D0S0), where S0=1, so that the first term collapses to C0
β(1-
D0), while the second term is the product of (C1
β/1+r) by (1-D0-D1S1), which is equal to 
(C1
β/1+r) . (1-D0-D1S0(1-D0)), whose second factor is equal to (1-D0)(1-D1S0), and thus to (1-
D0)(1-D1). Moreover, given that  Dn is assumed to be equal to 1, the last term is multiplied by 
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j t D S ], expression (3*) can 
be rewritten as: 
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which corresponds to equation (4). 
 
 
Derivation of expression (12)
53 
 
Expression (10) is 
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(10) α(t)=L(t)+γ/C(t)  
 
Then, by differentiating with respect to time, and dividing by α on each side, one has: 
 
(5*) Gα = GL(L(t)/α(t))-GC(γ/α(t)C(t)).  
 
This implies, for t=0,  
 
(6*) Gα =GL(L(0)/α(0))-GC(C*(0)/C(0)).  
 
But given that L(0)/α(0)=1- (γ/α(0)C(0))=1-(C*(0)/C(0)) [obtained by (10) and γ=C*(t) α(t)], 




which, under the assumption (5), is equal to expression (12). 
 
 
Derivation of expression (15)
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By substituting (9*) and (10*) into (8*), one obtains: 
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The numerator of (11*) can be rewritten as: 
 


















































which is equal to:
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Substituting (13*) and (14*) into (11*) gives us: 
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7: Appendix 2: The Usher-Williamson-Miller framework and the relativity of welfare 
judgements 
 
It is clear that the precise effect of the inclusion of some ‘relativity’ in welfare 
judgements on the Usher-Williamson-Miller framework depends on the particular 
assumptions made on individual welfare. In this Appendix, I shall only consider a basic case, 
in which a simple comparison with respect to the most recent past experience(s) is introduced, 
so that individual welfare does no longer depend on absolute achievements only, but also on a 
comparison with some standard taken as a reference. 
























where λ is the parameter that synthesizes the relativity of welfare judgements. According to 
expression (16*), individual welfare depends not only on the absolute achievement in 
consumption, but also on the gap between current consumption and the consumption of the 
previous period. Expression (3) is a special case of (16*) in which λ is equal to zero. 
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The second factor of the first term is equal to (1-D0S0), where S0=1, while the second factor of 
the second term is equal to (1-D0-D1S0(1-D0)) = (1-D0)(1-D1S0) = (1-D0)(1-D1). Moreover, 
given that  Dn is assumed to be equal to 1, the last term is multiplied by Sn. Hence (19*) can 
be rewritten as: 
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j t D S ], expression (20*) can 
be rewritten as: 
 
(21*)  ) (
) 1 (
)] 2 ( ) 1 ( [
... ) (
1
)] ( ) 1 ( [




1 1 0 t S
r
n t C n t C
t S
r
t C t C

































It is at this precise stage that the importance of the assumptions on how the representative 
agent forms his expectations appears. If one makes, as in Section 2, the assumption that the 
representative agent assumes that current consumption will hold forever in the future, and if 
one also assumes that the future consumption flow is also equal to current real income 
[expression (5)], then it is easy to see that, under those assumptions, the introduction of some 
habits formation mechanism does not affect the adjusted income at all. 
Actually, under those assumptions, the adjusted income, can be defined as the income 
such that, if enjoyed in each period of remaining life while facing the survival conditions of a 
period of reference, it would make the representative agent indifferent with the situation in 
which he enjoys both the current income and the current survival conditions: 
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In the light of expression (22*), it is easy to see that, under those assumptions, the adjusted 
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Hence, under the assumptions made in Section 2, the introduction of an habit formation 
assumptions does not affect the value of the adjusted income, nor its growth rate. The 
rationale behind that result goes as follows. Once the representative agent expects constant 
consumption over time, the unique effect of the habit formation mechanism is that a 
proportion (1- λ) of his income – instead of the totality of income – will be ‘enjoyed’. But, 
given that the same proportion applies to the adjusted income, the value of λ does not affect  
the level of the adjusted income.  
Alternatively, if one relaxes the assumption of constant expected income over time, it 
can be seen that habituation has an ambiguous effect on the value of the adjusted income. 
Actually, under the assumption of non-constant expected income, expression (22*) becomes: 
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From expression (24*), the adjusted income can be written as: 
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Naturally, for λ equal to zero, expression (25*) corresponds to the definition of the adjusted 
income in the case of no habits formation (see supra). 
Let us now consider the influence of the habits formation parameter λ on the level of the 
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where θ refers to the big expression in brackets at the numerator of expression (25*). While 
the denominator of (26*) is unambiguously positive, the first term of the numerator is 
negative, whereas the second term of the numerator is positive, so that the sign of the 
derivative is unknown. It is worth discussing briefly the two effects at work. The first term of 
the numerator is negative, and reflects the fact that, once habituation is introduced, the welfare 
associated to each period is, ceteris paribus, lower than without habituation, so that the 
welfare gain from remaining alive is also lowered by the introduction of habituation. The 
extent to which the welfare gain from remaining alive is smaller depends not only on λ, but 
also on the income prevailing at the anterior period. This negative effect of λ on the adjusted 
income is captured by the first term of the numerator. One should notice that, in the case in 
which the income at t-1 is zero, the first, negative, effect disappears. However, there is also 
another effect, which plays in the opposite direction. Once habituation mechanisms work, the 
monetary compensation that is required to compensate the fact of facing worse survival 
conditions is increased, because the habituation somewhere ‘weakens’ the power of income in 
terms of welfare. That second effect is captured in the second term of the numerator of (26*). 
It should be stressed that, when the income at t-1 is zero, the first effect disappears, but the 
second effect remains, because, in presence of habituation, a larger adjusted income is, ceteris 
paribus, required to compensate the higher mortality. 
To summarize, the introduction of basic habituation mechanisms within the present 
approach leads various effects, depending on the assumptions made on expected future 
consumption. If one adheres to the assumptions made in Section 2, then the adjusted income 
remains unaffected by the inclusion of a standard of reference. However, if one relaxes the 
assumption of constant expected future income, then habituation has an effect on the adjusted 
income and on its growth rate, but its sign and magnitude depend on the relative importance 
of two effects, playing in opposite directions. Hence much work remains to be done to explore 
the consequences from relaxing the assumptions made in Section 2, even though, from a 
normative point of view, it is far from clear that the measurement of social welfare changes 
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8: Appendix 3: Sources of data and methodology 
 
Mortality rates (men and women) cover 8 ages-categories: less than 5 year-old, between 
5 and 15 year-old, 15-20, 20-25, 25-45, 45-65, 65-75, and 75 year-old and above. Age group 
mortality rates are constructed by following the methodology proposed by the United Nations 
(see United Nations, 1996). It consists of dividing the number of people who died at some age 





+(t) / ng(t) 
 
where dg(t) is the mortality rate of group g for year t; ng
+(t) is the number of people who 
belong to group g who died during year t; ng(t) is the number of people who belong to group g 
on the first of January of year t.
59 
It should be stressed that the mortality rates constructed by following the usual method 
constitute only approximations of the true probabilities of dying at particular ages, which are 
provided by the mortality tables, which unfortunately cover an unsatisfactory period for the 
present purposes. Annual age-specific mortality rates are constructed on the assumption that 
the mortality rate for any age group applies equally to all ages that belong to that age-interval. 
The maximum age is assumed to be 85 years. This assumption, which comes from the 
insufficient availability of data, is not restrictive (people above 85 year-old represented only 
0.20 per cent of the population in 1866, 0.63 per cent in 1961 and 1.32 per cent in 1981). 
Within the model, it was assumed that all deaths occurring in a year take place on the 
first day of that year. Given that it is clearly not the case in real life (i.e. the death during the 
last life-year can potentially take place at all times during that year), it follows that the life 
expectancy computed on the basis of the theoretical model may underestimate the ‘true’ life 
expectancy. Therefore, some correction is required to account for the fact that in real life 
death does not necessarily occur on the first day of the period. In order to compute the 
discounted life expectancy at age j, the following formula was used, where dk is an age-
























The numerator of expression (28*) is the sum of the probability of a man of age j completing 
at least i-j years of life [i.e. ∏ = −
i
j k k d ) 1 ( ] and half the probability of his dying i-j years from 




j k k d d ∏
−
= −  ] . Hence, expression (28*) accounts for the fact that a man who 
will die i years from now has an expectation of staying alive for half of that year (and not zero 
year as assumed in the model). 
The population-weighted discounted life expectancy is then obtained from computing 
the weighted sum of the age-specific discounted life expectancies, by means of weights 
representing the proportion of each age-groups at some base years:
60 
 

















where nj(t*) is the number of people of age j at the base year t*, while n(t*) is the total 
population at that base year.    36 
 
 
Regarding the economic growth rates on which our adjustment exercise is based, these 
are computed from Angus Maddison’s historical data sets. Our real GDP per head series was 
obtained by dividing the real GDP levels in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (see Maddison, 1995, 
table C-16a, pp. 180-181, for the period before 1960, and, for after 1960, the database 
OECDG03 from Maddison’s website at the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
(http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc)) by our own population figures for Belgium, in order to have a 
perfect correspondence between the population figures used for the computation of real GDP 
per head and the population figures used in the computation of mortality rates and population-
weighted discounted life expectancies.
61 The post-1960 real GDP levels, which correspond to 
revised estimates of real GDP satisfying the 1993 SNA (Standardized system of National 
Accounts), account for substantial expenditures on computer software since the 1980s.
62 
Nevertheless, there is no incompatibility between the two resulting sets of growth rates, 
because there is (almost) no difference between the two series and their growth rates during 
the 1950s and the 1960s; it is only after 1970 that statistically significant differences appear 
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Notes 
 
1 On various weaknesses of national accounts statistics, see Beckerman (1968), Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), Sen 
(1973a), Eisner (1988), Nordhaus (1994, 2000) and Dasgupta (2001). 
2 See Hicks (1940), Beckerman (1980) and Klasen (1994). 
3 On the causes of Easterlin’s Paradox, see Abramovitz (1979). For an illustration in the U.S. and the U.K. 
(during the last 30 years), see Blanchflower and Oswald (2000). 
4 As Sen (1998) pointed out, if one considers the speed of convergence between poor and rich countries, life 
expectancy shows most often a quicker convergence than GDP per head. 
5 See Beckerman (1968). Under each option, the aggregation may cause a loss of information: keeping separate 
indicators may provide a more detailed view. Hence, composite indicators should be regarded as complements 
rather than substitutes to single-variable indicators. 
6 See Costa and Steckel (1997), Sandberg and Steckel (1997), Crafts (1997a, 2002), and Nordhaus (1998). 
7 The next pages are based on Usher (1973a, pp. 197-208) and (1980, pp. 233-243). 
8 See Conley (1976) for a model where survival probabilities are behavioural variables. 
9 For a general framework in which in which both the past, present and future welfare are taken into account, see 
Ponthiere (2004). 
10 One should notice here that expression (2), having the expected utility form, is unique up to a strictly positive 
affine transformation.  
11 Usher’s (discrete) framework also relies on the assumption that the whole risk of dying is concentrated on the 
first day of any period, that is, on one’s birthday. 
12 See Mas-Colell et al (1995) and Hammond (1998) on the expected utility hypothesis. 
13 Let us consider the particular case where the representative individual’s preferences are such that what the 
individual would like to avoid, above everything, is a fall in his consumption profile over time. His utility 
function, in a two-period model, may be given, for instance, by U(c1, c2) = c1 + c2 - µ(c1-c2). Let us make the 
assumption of an extreme ‘relativity’ of welfare (e.g. µ=100). With such preferences, the representative agent 
would strictly prefer the consumption vector (50, 50) to the vector (100, 99), which can be regarded as clearly 
irrational: at any period the consumption under (100, 99) exceeds substantially the consumption under (50, 50). 
The priority given to the avoidance of a fall in consumption profile seems to be some kind of irrationality that 
should not affect the measurement of changes in welfare. Hence, even though empirical evidence supports the 
relativity hypothesis, that is, a strictly positive µ (see Michalos, 1980), it is questionable, from the point of view 
of the measurement of social welfare changes over time, that a positive µ should be taken into account. The 
present framework can thus be regarded as imposing, in a ‘paternalistic’ way, the postulate that µ should be 
regarded as equal to zero. 
14 Given that the present model is based on the assumption of no inequality in consumption, I shall not 
investigate here the other ‘relativity’ assumption, that is, the relativity with respect to what other people achieve.  
15 In other words, it is assumed that the utility of a life-year with zero consumption is zero. 
16 See the Appendix for the derivation. 
17 One should notice that it is always possible to replace the probability of survival up to j, Sj, by Sj-1 (1-Dj-1) [i.e. 
the product of the survival probability up to j-1 by the probability of surviving the period j-1]. One should also 
notice that the sum of the Pj for j  going from 0 to n is equal to 1. Actually, 
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(see Usher, 1980, footnote 7).  
18 Actually, expression (5) differs from an assumption of habit formation. In the latter case, well-being in t+1 
would be assessed relatively to what prevailed in the past (e.g. in period t), while, in the present framework, 
well-being in t+1 will depend on Ci+1(t+1), that is, on the absolute consumption achieved in period t+1, 
independently of what was achieved in t, and of what was expected, at t, to be achieved in t+1. Hence there is no 
relativity of welfare judgements in the present framework, where the well-being of a period is always assessed in 
the light of what is currently achieved – and not of what was achieved or previously expected to be achieved. 
19 Figure 1 is based on Usher (1980, Figure 11.4 p. 240). 
20 One should notice here that the adjusted income – and thus its growth rate – is invariant to any strictly positive 
affine transformation of the representative agent’s expected utility function. 
21 For instance, when there is a complete statu quo, Li(t)/Li(t*)=Lj(t)/Lj(t*)=1, so that the adjusted incomes for 
individuals i and j are all equal to Y(t).   
22 The rest of this Section is based on Williamson (1984), pp. 162-163, equations (8) and (9). 
23 See Williamson (1984), Figure 2, p. 164. 
24 See the Appendix for the derivation. 
25 The VSL corresponds, for instance, to the amount of money a group of 10,000 people would be willing to pay 
to reduce the mortality rate from 0.0010 to 0.0009.   44 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
26 The reference to time is here omitted for convenience. See the Appendix for the derivation. 
27 For empirical evidence, see Jones-Lee et al (1985), Viscusi and Evans (1990), and Miller (2000). 
28 One should notice here that, in the general case in which the assumption (5) of constant consumption across 
ages is not made, it might be the case, as Kniesner et al (2004) showed, that the old has ‘more to loose’ than the 
young, because of a life-cycle planning deferring consumption to the old age (e.g. if the old has much larger 
consumption, his VSL may exceed the one of the young, despite the lower life expectancy of the old).   
29 That hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence: see Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982). However, Smith 
and Desvousges (1987) found the inverse relationship: willingness-to-pay for a given reduction in risks would 
tend to fall with the level of base risk. 
30 On the age-dependency of VSL, see also Aldy and Viscusi (2003), and Kniesner et al (2004). 
31 It should be stressed that there is no consensus on whether preferences can be irrational. See Broome (1993b) 
for a discussion on the possibility of irrational preferences. 
32 It should be stressed that what L accounts for is not life expectancy at birth. The VSL is not the value of the 
life of a newborn person, but the value of a statistical life in the economy considered. Hence the relevant concept 
is the population-weighted life expectancy (i.e. the weighted sum of life expectancies at all ages, with weights 
reflecting the statistical proportions of all age groups within the economy). 
33 If r is interpreted as representing people’s ‘pure’ time preferences, then a higher r should lead to lower 
adjustments. In our framework, a higher r  leads to larger adjustments, so that the discount rate is better 
interpreted here as a correction that is introduced against people’s myopia (leading to an underestimation of the 
value of longevity improvements). 
34 See, for instance, Auster, Leveson and Sarachek (1969), Preston (1975, 1980), Anand and Ravallion (1993), 
Pritchett and Summers (1996) and Easterlin (1999). 
35 Note that average compound GDP growth rate over the period 1870-1881 is used as an approximation of the 
period 1867-1881. 
36 Unadjusted and adjusted average growth rates in Table 3 are obtained by taking the geometric average of one 
plus  the annual growth rate, minus  one, over the periods considered. The resulting average growth rates 
correspond to the annual average compound growth rates over the periods considered. See Kakwani (1997) for a 
general discussion on the computation of average growth rates out of annual growth rates. 
37 See Jones-Lee (1976, 1982) and Broome (1978a, 1985). 
38 On the dependence on income, age and level of risks, see the references above. Regarding unionisation,  Olson 
(1981) found a positive effect, while Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) and Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) 
found no effect (see Viscusi, 2003). On the influence of cultural factors on VSL, see Hersch and Viscusi (1990), 
who showed that, independently of differences in education and unionisation, cigarette smokers and seatbelt 
non-wearers receive lower compensations for riskier jobs, leading to a lower VSL. On the dependence to the 
kind of risk, see Johansson (1995). 
39 Actually, Hanemann (1991) argued that the divergence between the willingness-to-pay and the willingness-to-
accept can only disappear with full information and repeated exposure to the market if the good in question has a 
very close substitute, so that the substitution with that good is high. Given that this is not the case for risk of 
death (see Shogren et al, 1994), the divergence between WTA and WTP is likely to persist in the field under 
study, which raises the question of the right VSL estimate to be chosen.  
40 For instance, the value of a reduction in mortality from 0.2 to 0.1 conditional on a heart attack might be higher 
than the value of a mortality reduction from 0.02 to 0.01 with a probability of heart attack of 0.1. 
41 See the detailed studies by Mitchell and Carson (1989) and Johansson (1995). For a critical assessment of 
willingness-to-pay surveys on health issues over the period 1985-1998, see Olsen and Smith (2001). 
42 In particular, as Fuchs and Zeckhauser (1987) underlined, respondents to hypothetical questions on health 
trade-offs seem to be risk averse with respect to gains but risk preferring with respect to losses. 
43 See Usher (1980), p. 229. 
44 Within the utilitarian tradition, that issue is discussed by Cowen (1989) and Ng (1989b). 
45 As Professor Pestieau pointed out to me, adjusted growth rates regard as equal two countries with the same 
growth in income and longevity, even if, for instance, people in one country, thanks to an earlier retirement age, 
benefit to a larger extent from longevity gains. 
46 As Viscusi (1993) underlined, the bias in VSL estimates may be non-negligible, for instance in wage-risks 
studies ignoring non-materialistic motivations (e.g. social prestige). 
47 For instance, estimating the value of the social prestige associated to a job requires to know the – much higher 
– extra-wage one would require to accept the same job without the social prestige. However, most often the same 
job without the social prestige does not exist. 
48 On leisure time, see Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), Usher (1973b), Beckerman (1980) and Zolotas (1981).  
49 See Parducci (1968), Michalos (1980), Smith et al (1989) and Tversky and Griffin (1991).  
50 Broome (1978b) made a similar remark in a discussion on the choice-preference relation.   45 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
51 This is also confirmed by the large monetary equivalent to the death of a husband or wife in Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2000). 
52 It should be stressed that this may or may not be the case if inequalities are measured in terms of the time-
distance necessary to reach some level of reference (see Sicherl, 1980). 
53 See Williamson (1984), footnote 15. 
54 See Usher (1980), footnotes 11 and 12. 
55 For instance, the probability of death in 25 years does not affect the probability of a remaining life exactly 10 
years. 
56 Actually, the expression in the large brackets is equal to 1. The reason for that is simply that each product 
corresponds to the probability of survival up to age j while being of age t+1. Each of those product is multiplied 
by the corresponding probability of death at age j, so that each term of the sum corresponds to the probability of 
a remaining life of exactly j-(t+1) years. But the summation takes place over the whole range of potential lengths 
of remaining life (i.e. from 0 to n-(t+1)), so that that sum, which covers all possible remaining lengths of life, 
must be equal to 1.  
57 By an argument similar to the one underlying the derivation of expression (4) above. 
58 Sources: various publications of the Belgian Institut National de Statistiques:  Annuaire Statistique de la 
Belgique (1871-1995), Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique et du Congo Belge (1912-1959), and Statistiques 
Demographiques (1996-2002).   
59 Sources: ng
+(t) and ng(t) are from publications of the Belgian Institut National de Statistiques: several volumes 
of the Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique (volume 2 (1871)- volume 113 (1995)) and the Annuaire Statistique 
de la Belgique et du Congo Belge (1912-1959). 
60 Sources:  Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique et du Congo Belge, volume 44, (1913) and  Annuaire Statistique 
de la Belgique, volume 113, (1995). 
61 Sources: Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique (volume 2 (1871) – volume 113 (1995)), the Annuaire Statistique 
de la Belgique et du Congo Belge (1912-1959), and the Statistiques Demographiques (years 1996-2002). Unlike 
Maddison (1995), I did not raise the 1820-1924 population figures by 0.8 per cent (in order to include Eupen and 
Malmedy acquired in 1925), because I wanted the population figures to correspond exactly to the figures used 
for the computation of mortality rates and population-weighted discounted life expectancies. 
62 In the 1993 SNA, expenditure on mineral exploration and computer software are now treated as investments 
rather than intermediate inputs (see Maddison 2001, p. 189). 